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Nigeria's economic outlook: Progress on reform and prospects for inclusive growth Nigeria's economic outlook: Progress on reform and prospects for inclusive growth 22 October 2026 — 13:00 TO 14:00 BST Anonymous (not verified) 9 October 2026 Chatham House and Online Hear Nigerian Minister of Finance Hon. Taiwo Oyedele discuss the government's economic reform measures, the progress towards inclusive societal benefit and the prospects for advancing broad-based economic growth. Hear Nigerian Minister of Finance Hon. Taiwo Oyedele discuss the government's economic reform measures, the progress towards inclusive societal benefit and the prospects for advancing broad-based economic growth. Shortly after taking office, Nigerian president Bola Tinubu introduced the country's most significant economic reforms since 2007, by scrapping fuel subsidies and floating the naira. While external consensus suggested subsidy removal was long overdue, the abrupt policy shift exacerbated inflation and deepened food insecurity, increasing hardships for many Nigerian households. The reforms have nonetheless been credited as key drivers of improved macroeconomic stability and investor sentiment, with GDP growth in 2026 projected at 4.1 per cent by the IMF. However, inclusivity remains a key issue.This event discusses:With 63 per cent of Nigerians living below the poverty line, how will Nigeria ensure the inclusivity of its economic agenda?How will Nigeria ensure its deepening security challenges do not further impact its economic trajectory?How does Nigeria intend to maintain investor sentiment while navigating an uncertain global context?How does Nigerian leadership intend to address public concerns over livelihoods and living costs ahead of the president elections in January 2027?

Europe, Brazil and beyond: Is the populist wave gathering momentum? Europe, Brazil and beyond: Is the populist wave gathering momentum? Audio sseth.drupal@c… 9 October 2026 In this week's episode of Independent Thinking, our experts discuss the expected shift to the right in Spain, France, Germany and Brazil's upcoming elections. The rightward movement in democracies in Europe and beyond shows little sign of slowing. Germany has elected its first far-right regional government in Saxony-Anhalt. In France, voter anger with Emmanuel Macron puts the Rassemblement National's Marine Le Pen in pole position for the presidency. In Spain, Pedro Sánchez called a snap election in an attempt to mobilise the beleaguered left around Spain's housing crisis. And Flávio Bolsonaro's success in the first round of Brazil's presidential elections suggests a second round of anti-woke, pro-Trump bolsonarismo is on the cards. What is driving politics to the populist right? And what does it mean for global security, stability and efforts to preserve what's left of the rules-based order?Bronwen Maddox is joined by Grégoire Roos, director of our Europe and Russia and Eurasia Programmes; Nic Lawley, special adviser to the director of Chatham House; and Dr Christopher Sabatini, director of our Latin America Programme.About Independent ThinkingIndependent Thinking is a weekly international affairs podcast hosted by our director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.More ways to listen: Apple Podcasts and Spotify.Explore our other Chatham House podcasts.

Brazil's Amazon rainforest is at risk if Bolsonaro wins – but its low-carbon economy is here to stay Brazil's Amazon rainforest is at risk if Bolsonaro wins – but its low-carbon economy is here to stay Expert comment LToremark 7 October 2026 If Flávio Bolsonaro wins Brazil's presidential run-off, he will likely roll back Lula's deforestation regulations. But the country's low-carbon transition will be harder to reverse. The outcome of the first round of Brazil's presidential election has put President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and his main challenger Flávio Bolsonaro – son of former president Jair Bolsonaro – into a run-off at the end of October. The result itself is not surprising. But Bolsonaro's stronger-than-expected advantage over Lula and the consolidation of a right-leaning Congress – particularly the Senate – is. If Bolsonaro becomes president, Brazil will join the right-wing wave sweeping across Latin America. Related work Brazil's presidential election is more than just another polarized contest This shift to the right will impact Brazil's climate transition plans. A Bolsonaro presidency backed by a sympathetic Congress will have considerable power to weaken existing environmental protections. But that does not mean that Brazil's entire climate transition would go into reverse.Brazil's climate agenda is often presented as a contest between environmental protection and economic development. The reality is more complicated. The important question is which parts of Brazil's climate policy a president can change, which require congressional support, and where trade, investment and private-sector interests constrain political choices.Brazil's president has considerable executive power over environmental outcomes. The president appoints the leadership of environmental protection agencies such as the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA), determines enforcement priorities and allocates budgets that can either strengthen or weaken environmental protection within months. But economic forces also set boundaries. Brazil is deeply dependent on agricultural and natural-resource exports, and increasingly on oil. At the same time, large flows of private and foreign investment are reinforcing renewable power, electricity transmission and distribution, electric vehicles and other low-carbon industries. This distinction reflects Brazil's unusual emissions profile. Unlike many large emerging economies, two thirds of the country's greenhouse emissions are linked to land-use change. Brazil's energy system is relatively clean; renewables already provide around 87 per cent of its electricity. The Amazon is at risk if Bolsonaro winsThe greatest risk from a Bolsonaro victory is therefore likely to be land use and deforestation.When Lula returned to office in 2023, his government restored environmental enforcement, agency capacity and satellite monitoring. Under environment minister Marina Silva, Amazon deforestation fell substantially. The latest annual PRODES, an official satellite monitoring system estimate put Amazon deforestation at 5,731 square kilometres in 2025, around half the 2022 level.However, enforcement regulations are reversible by executive power if they are not complemented by policy packages that structurally change land-use practices. Transforming Brazil's underlying land-use model requires cooperation with the country's powerful agribusiness sector, which Marina Silva did not secure. Policy packages would have to move beyond policing towards land-tenure reform, traceability, rural-credit conditions, restoration of degraded land and incentives that make productivity gains more profitable than land clearing and expansion.If Flávio Bolsonaro follows his father's approach, he will likely reduce the enforcement capability and, with congressional support, further loosen environmental licensing and forest protection regulations like Brazil's forest code. Renewable energy transformation is harder to reverseA Bolsonaro government would have much less room to change Brazil's renewable-energy trajectory. Brazil has structural advantages in hydropower, wind, solar and biofuels. These sectors are supported not only by climate policies but by competitive costs, growing electricity demand, existing infrastructure, private investment and powerful domestic industries. Biofuels, a sector that is broadly supported by Brazilian civil society and agribusiness, will continue to have a strategic role. Unlike in many European economies, Brazil's ethanol and biodiesel industries combine climate objectives with agricultural, industrial and energy-security interests. Given the existing renewable assets, investments and private sector contracts in place – and Bolsonaro's strong alignment with private sector interests – it would be harder for him to change policy direction in this area.The importance of oilAlongside its renewable energy transformation, Brazil has also become a major oil producer. The discovery and development of the offshore pre-salt oil reserves has made Brazil the 9th largest oil producer in the world and the largest in Latin America. It has attracted significant investment and is expanding production capability. In addition, the state-controlled oil company Petrobras is central in public finances at both federal and state level. In 2025, it paid R$277.6 billion in taxes, 7 per cent of Brazil's total tax revenues. The continuing disruption around the Strait of Hormuz strengthens the strategic value of Atlantic Basin producers like Brazil, Guyana, Canada and the US. Bolsonaro's alignment with Washington and other right-leaning Latin American producers could reinforce the formation a new axis of oil production in the Americas. This could lock Brazil further into the position of becoming a strategic producer globally.Although both Lula and Bolsonaro would continue to enhance Brazil's production capability, Bolsonaro would likely push harder for faster licensing, private investment and offshore exploration. In 2025, Petrobras was granted a highly controversial exploration licence in the Equatorial Margin, along the Foz do Amazonas River basin and have since discovered oil. There are concerns Bolsonaro would accelerate the licensing for further exploratory drilling in the Amazon region.The China factor and impact of Brazil's trade relationships  Related work The Climate Briefing: Climate change, energy and geopolitics Brazil's trade and investment relationships will limit both Lula and Bolsonaro's manoeuvrability on climate actions. Even if Bolsonaro is politically aligned with Trump, there are economic interests that will limit his ability to track too closely with the US administration – particularly on China.China is Brazil's largest export market, accounting for roughly 28 per cent of Brazil's exports. It bought almost 80 per cent of Brazilian soybean export volumes in 2025, 45 per cent of exported crude oil and is also a major buyer of Brazilian beef and iron ore. This gives Chinese demand considerable influence over the economics of Brazilian land use and resource production. China's dominance limits the effectiveness of other trade partners' environmental regulations, such as the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR). Although the EUDR can impose stringent traceability requirements on commodities entering the European market, it cannot by itself determine production practices across Brazilian supply chains. The regulation will only affect the portion of large Brazilian exporters, commodity traders and banks that operate across multiple markets and therefore have commercial reasons to maintain traceability even if federal enforcement weakens. China's importance also extends beyond trade. There are strong economic and investment interests between the two countries. The private sector in Brazil is not as suspicious of Chinese investment and technology as their American or European counterparts. In 2025, Brazil was the largest recipient of Chinese investment, with $6.1 billion invested primarily in renewable energy, clean technology and mining, further consolidating their strategic global positioning in renewable supply. Although Brazil's current climate ambitions would be undermined if Bolsonaro wins October's run-off, not all would be lost. The future of the Amazon rainforest is most at risk and the most vulnerable part of the country's climate agenda. Brazil's energy transition, however, is likely to progress regardless of who wins. 

After the RAF Fairford incident, the UK should develop its homeland defence forces After the RAF Fairford incident, the UK should develop its homeland defence forces Expert comment thilton.drupal 7 October 2026 The threat of hybrid attacks from Iran and Russia means the UK should develop a force dedicated to protecting its bases and infrastructure at home. Finland and Poland offer lessons. The US's withdrawal of its bombers from RAF Fairford, following a suspected terror plot against the base, has brought attention to how the UK defends its homeland military bases and other critical infrastructure.The UK government has insisted RAF Fairford is safe following the arrest of five men near the base on 27 September. President Donald Trump said the US withdrew its bombers from the base because of an unspecified 'threat' to the base. The investigation into the incident is still ongoing. Prime Minister Andy Burnham said that there are 'strong indications that Iran played a part,' which Iran's embassy in London has rejected. In March, the UK approved a US request to use RAF Fairford for what it described as defensive strikes on Iran. Tehran responded that any base used for 'aggression against Iranian territory' would be a 'legitimate target' for its forces.Bases such as Fairford have their own protection forces that guard the perimeter. But incidents like this highlight the need for the UK to improve its wider homeland defence forces in the face of sustained pressure from hostile actors such as Iran and Russia. While the UK has specialist counter-terrorism units that can respond to incidents, and its armed forces and reserves can be deployed domestically to aid civil authorities in a crisis, it lacks a specialist domestic-only force that could protect a wider range of sites for a longer period.Response versus protection The Fairford incident is just one example of the various hybrid threats facing the UK. Alongside Iran, Russia in particular poses a major threat. The Cabinet Office recently announced it would brief the chief executives of UK critical national infrastructure providers and defence firms on the 'enduring and significant threat' from Russia. Danish intelligence has also warned that Russia could mount a limited military attack against a NATO member within months. Across Europe, states have attributed drone incursions, arson and sabotage to Russia.Protecting domestic sites is different to identifying the perpetrators or deciding on retaliatory measures. These happen after an attack; protection must be in place before one. This requires forces built for protection, not just response – which is what some UK allies already have. Poland and Finland's approachesPoland and Finland have both taken a structural approach, creating forces whose primary purpose is the defence of their own territory. Established in 2017, Poland's Territorial Defence Force is the fifth branch of its armed forces. Recruited locally and organized around a brigade in each province, it remains in its own province when Poland mobilizes its forces, rather than reinforcing the regular military. Its stated tasks include protecting critical national infrastructure.  Related work Russia's Kaliningrad threats show the value of Baltic preparedness Finland's approach is broader. A permanent security committee coordinates preparedness across government, working from a list of key functions that the state must keep running in a crisis such as water, energy and transport. Military and civilian planning sits within a single framework rather than separate departments. The premise is that defending the home territory is a permanent task, rather than a contingency to be activated during a conflict.  Neither of these two models directly transfers to the UK. Poland's territorial force reflects its position bordering Belarus and Russia's Kaliningrad. Finland's rests on conscription and a political culture influenced by its long border with Russia. However, the principle beneath both examples is transferable: protecting home territory requires forces raised specifically for the task, not carved out of regular forces each time they are needed. The UK has currently not adopted this principle. It does not have a dedicated force assigned to protecting a wide set of UK sites for a long period. Architecture without dedicated forces The UK is not starting from scratch. The Cabinet Office runs the Home Defence Programme, a cross-government effort to align military and civilian planning for threats to the UK. The 2026 Resilience Action Plan implementation report said the programme was being accelerated, with updated crisis response protocols and a planned national home defence exercise in 2027. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) has a Director of Homeland Defence and Strategic Threats. Standing Joint Command is the MOD's operational headquarters for UK resilience tasks. A report published in January by researchers at the University of Exeter set out what this architecture lacks. The report argues that home defence activity is fragmented; that no lead department holds a mandate with executive tasking authority and adequate resources; and that the UK is at a standing start while allies including Finland, Poland and the Baltic states are years ahead. Its recommendation of a designated lead department is a good starting point. Protecting home territory requires forces raised specifically for the task. However, even if these recommendations were implemented, a mandate does not produce troops. The UK has a reserve force. But alongside maintaining the UK's own defence and resilience, this force is also expected to contribute to NATO's collective defence and can be deployed abroad. Relying on the same reservists for both tasks only works while these two demands do not arrive at the same time. UK land forces are designed on the assumption that they will be deployed abroad, rather than defend domestic sites. In a crisis on the European continent, the task of domestic protection would not disappear. It would compete with the demand for British land forces to be deployed elsewhere.Three changes the UK should makeThree changes follow. The UK should base its approach on the Polish design principle. This means setting up new reserve sub-units with a purely domestic protective role, recruited and based locally. These new units would be positioned near the bases and critical national infrastructure most likely to attract attention, and not counted as reinforcements for deploying formations elsewhere.The new units would not replace existing forces. Guard forces such as the MOD Police and the Military Provost Guard Service, along with the RAF Regiment for air bases, would remain responsible for perimeters and immediate site security. And specialist units would still respond to incidents. Instead, the new units would do what the existing forces are not designed to do: secure non-military critical infrastructure, cover the ground beyond the perimeters, and protect multiple locations during a period of heightened threat. They would be designed to hold these sites for periods of months rather than days.  In a crisis on the European continent, the task of domestic protection would not disappear. This does come at a cost. Every reservist given a home defence role is one fewer available for deployment, and that is a real reduction in what the UK can send abroad. But in a situation when both home defence and overseas demands occur, the choice of home defence will need to be prioritized by default. Making that choice deliberately now means the force is generated and ready before that happens. From Finland, the UK should take the treatment of homeland protection as a permanent function rather than a contingency. This means protecting a budget for it, since activity funded from training and readiness budgets is vulnerable when defence budgets are squeezed. The British Army has already reportedly been told to suspend major exercises this year for lack of funds, and in September it was reported that army reservists are set to serve fewer days because of budget cuts.  Want to hear more on the evolving security landscape? Join experts and policymakers at our Security and Defence Conference for candid analysis of today's most pressing threats. Finally, the UK's distribution of its protective forces should follow from the government's decisions and the threats those decisions potentially attract, rather than from isolated incidents. When the government permits an operation from British territory, as it did at Fairford, it should decide the protective requirements at the site and its surrounding areas at the same time. The UK has the intelligence capability and the legal framework to protect its domestic sites. It also has the beginnings of a coordinating structure, though it needs a clearer lead. What it now also needs is a dedicated force assigned to protecting those sites across the homeland. 

Russia's Kaliningrad threats show the value of Baltic preparedness Russia's Kaliningrad threats show the value of Baltic preparedness Expert comment jon.wallace 7 October 2026 Moscow's nuclear rhetoric should be taken seriously. But Baltic states know grey zone attacks and territorial incursions are equally serious threats. Vladimir Putin always chooses his words carefully. If Russia faced a direct attack on Kaliningrad (its enclave on the Baltic Sea), he warned on 1 October, the use of 'all weapons in (our) country's arsenal' would inevitably be on the table. The statement followed an earlier Russian note to NATO, threatening nuclear escalation if the alliance were to isolate Kaliningrad. NATO, thus far, has responded with restraint. Secretary General Mark Rutte said there was no imminent Russian threat and rebuffed Moscow's nuclear rhetoric. But this skirmishing has pushed Kaliningrad – and NATO's Baltic borders with Russia – back into the spotlight. Kaliningrad is not just any territory for the Russians. At the Yalta and Potsdam conferences of 1945, Soviet leader Stalin asserted his claim to what was then known as Königsberg. It was, he said, necessary for Russia to have at least 'one ice-free port' at the expense of Germany. The US and UK consented, and Moscow gained a permanent military position on the Baltic Sea. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of the Baltic states to become independent democracies, Kaliningrad's geographical isolation from Russia became more apparent, creating one of the most peculiar pieces of land on the continent. Today the enclave hosts Russia's Baltic Fleet, missile systems and combat aircraft. Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the surrounding geopolitics has changed. Finland and Sweden are now part of NATO. Poland is rearming at unprecedented speed. And the military presence across the alliance's north-eastern flank is much denser. Meanwhile, Lithuania may soon vote to lift a ban on hosting nuclear weapons on its territory – a move the Kremlin described on 6 October as 'a step towards escalating tensions'.Kaliningrad remains a key forward position for Russia. But its near-complete isolation, in the middle of a more coherent NATO Baltic presence, presents Moscow with a serious geostrategic and military challenge.Denying Russia a quick victoryOne glance at the map is enough to understand that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have but little strategic depth. The three states depend heavily on the Suwałki corridor – a 65km strip of land between Kaliningrad and Belarus that connects Poland and Lithuania – for overland reinforcement. Reclaiming territory from an attacker would be an unlikely option for Baltic countries.The only credible alternative is to make a Russian advance difficult from the beginning. 'We have to start from the border and win from the first battles,' Colonel Tarmo Kundla, commander of the Estonian First Brigade, recently declared.That is the purpose of the Baltic Defence Line along the eastern border: bunkers, anti-tank obstacles and other defensive outposts. Estonia plans hundreds of squad-level bunkers. A permanently deployed German armoured brigade will become operational in Lithuania in 2027. And Finland now hosts a NATO Forward Land Force. Defence spending across the region has risen far beyond NATO's old two-per-cent target to reach nearly 5.5 per cent in the case of Estonia.The intention is clear. Russia must be deterred from any attempt to seize even a small amount of territory – a significant possibility if Russia were to test NATO resolve. Preparedness before the first bullet is shotBut Baltic defence measures are about more than spending commitments and defending their Russian borders. Baltics countries know that to deter Russia it is just as vital to stress test their critical infrastructure and train their societies to keep functioning if and when a crisis emerges. Indeed, there is a lot the rest of the continent could learn from Baltic states' whole-of-society model, which seeks to prepare their entire populations for an era of high-threat risk.  Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have accelerated preparations for grey zone conflict of the kind in which Russia excels, including attacks on infrastructure. From Finland to Lithuania, this model consists of embedding all the layers of society in defence and preparedness strategies. This form of 'comprehensive security' is grounded in the belief that keeping the country functioning in a crisis is a shared responsibility of government, business, civil society and citizens. In this regard, the Baltics are the most strategically advanced in Europe.Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have accelerated preparations for grey zone conflict of the kind in which Russia excels, including attacks on infrastructure. All three have disconnected their electricity systems from Russian and Belarusian networks, progressively synchronizing them with the continental grid since February 2025. In the meantime, NATO has increased protection of Baltic undersea infrastructure, following damaged cables and various incidences of suspected sabotage. Slowly learningEurope's larger military powers are awaking to the need to somehow follow the Baltic lead and prepare their societies for an enlarging spectrum of threats. Germany, which would serve as one of NATO's main logistical hubs in any reinforcement of the Baltic region, saw much of its civil-defence architecture fall into disrepair after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Its shelter capacity, for instance, now covers only around 480,000 people. Last spring Berlin approved a new €10-billion civil-defence programme, including plans to convert underground car parks, tunnels and stations into emergency shelters – evidence of renewed political engagement.France has tested its armed forces at scale in the Orion 26 high-intensity exercise, which brought together 12,500 troops, 24 allied nations and civilian institutions in a scenario ranging from hybrid attacks to large-scale conventional war. The UK has developed a 2026 resilience plan that explicitly acknowledges growing Russian sub-threshold attacks. And the government is considering a reserve-style home-defence force to protect critical infrastructure. These are important changes. But 'E3' countries are still struggling to jointly improve resilience in transport, healthcare, energy, and communications – even as the risk of an enemy trying to disrupt all of them at once grows.NATO is moving to drive the task forward. Its newly released resilience baseline requirements ask governments to plan for large movements of populations alongside military deployments; to develop health systems that can function even in case of mass casualties; and to develop communications and transport networks that can continue supporting allied forces during high-intensity conflict. In the near future, these will become the pillars on which deterrence actually depends.Baltic gapsStill, resilience won't be enough alone to vanquish an enemy attack on the region. Baltic air and missile defence remains rather thin considering the scale of Russia's drone and missile arsenal. Reinforcements would still have to reach the region through corridors like the Suwałki gap. And Russia would seize any opportunity to disrupt such movements. Fundamentally, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania remain reliant on their larger allies' ability to swiftly provide additional forces and air power in the event of a significant attack.This makes Stalin's 'ice-free port' of Kaliningrad more than an isolated flashpoint on the Baltic shores. Putin's nuclear rhetoric deserves to be taken seriously. Russia revised its nuclear doctrine in 2024, explicitly broadening the circumstances in which Moscow could consider nuclear use. These include threats to its territorial integrity and attempts to isolate parts of the Russian territory. But the military geography surrounding the enclave has changed too. Once referred to as NATO's most exposed flank, the Baltics have become much harder to intimidate, and harder still to overrun before NATO can respond.  Related work Poland could be Europe's rising star on defence and security Their experience also carries a wider lesson for Europe: strategic weight is not measured by size alone, even that of a nuclear arsenal. Agility, civil preparedness and political resolve have allowed small states, free and democratic since 1991, to alter the terms of deterrence at their border. They have shown Europe that resilience begins long before deterrence fails and that it can change the enemy's calculation. Their measures will make any attack look potentially far slower and costlier that Moscow would once have believed. Perhaps most significantly after the blatant failure of Russian objectives in Ukraine, Baltic resilience makes overall success of a military attack look far less certain for Vladimir Putin.

Sovereignty is not solitude: Canada's strategy for democratic technology leadership Sovereignty is not solitude: Canada's strategy for democratic technology leadership 13 October 2026 — 12:00 TO 13:00 BST Anonymous (not verified) 6 October 2026 Chatham House and Online Hear from Canada's Minister of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Innovation, Evan Solomon, on how trust, opportunity and sovereign control are shaping Canada's approach to artificial intelligence, economic growth and international partnership. Hear from Canada's Minister of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Innovation, Evan Solomon, on how trust, opportunity and sovereign control are shaping Canada's approach to artificial intelligence, economic growth and international partnership. This event will explore how Canada is translating its AI strengths into greater productivity, prosperity and better public services, and how deeper cooperation with partners such as the UK can strengthen AI safety, resilience and shared economic opportunity.This event discusses:What does sovereign control mean in an interconnected AI economy? And why does sovereignty not mean isolation?What are Canada's strengths as AI transforms economies, public services and national security?How can countries build trust in AI while accelerating innovation and adoption?How can investment in talent, literacy, research and key industries create new economic opportunities and better public services?How can Canada and the UK work together work together to strengthen AI safety, resilience and democratic technology leadership?

Sánchez's gamble: This 'all-in' election will have international impact Sánchez's gamble: This 'all-in' election will have international impact Expert comment jon.wallace 5 October 2026 Announcing the election, Sánchez set himself in opposition to President Trump and Javier Milei as well as Spain's populist right. Much will depend on the prime minister's ability to rally a fragmented left. The decision by Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez to call a snap election is a risky move, but he will have felt he had little choice. His decision fires the starting gun on a year of vital and polarized elections across Europe.The announcement is not entirely unexpected. Spain was required to hold an election by August 2027 anyway. And Sánchez's multiparty coalition has looked fragile since it formed in July 2023: it has not passed a full budget since. In January, the government approved a decree that regularized the status of 500,000 undocumented migrants and asylum seekers – a move unusual among EU countries generally committed to tightening migration restrictions. In July, the Spanish enclave of Ceuta was overwhelmed by a surge of tens of thousands of migrants, leading to criticism of government policy from within Spain and abroad, including US President Donald Trump. This month, a new issue has arisen, as protests grow over housing affordability. The protests prompted the government to introduce emergency legislation, only to see the bill rejected by Spain's Parliament late last week. This gave Sánchez his opening to call a general election, arguing that 'to do more, we need to renew and broaden the support of the people'. What are Sánchez's chances?Sánchez is a proven survivor and faced similar difficulties in 2023. But calling an election now is a gamble. The summer's crises have given his political opponents plenty to work with, and trouble assails the prime minister and his party, the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), from every side. The opposition on the right will use the January decree and images of the Ceuta crisis to rally their vote and criticize the government's competence. The left will point out the housing crisis has deteriorated under Sánchez. Then there are the corruption scandals that plague the prime minister. Some of his closest political allies are embroiled in the Koldo case – an investigation into corruption in health procurement contracts during the COVID-19 pandemic. In a separate case, the prime minister's own wife has been charged with embezzlement and corruption.To survive, Sánchez will use the same playbook that worked for him in 2023, where he characterized the contest as a choice between 'Sanchismo' (his brand of social democrat politics) or a 'backward-looking' far right.  Related work The Ceuta border crisis heaps pressure on Spain's Sánchez government – and European unity His hope will be that opposition to the PP right wing opposition party – and far right Vox party in particular – will mobilize left wing voters in a highly polarized contest. Vox leader Santiago Abascal regularly speaks of a 'migrant invasion' and used Sanchez's January decree to call for 'Repatriations, deportations and remigration'. Notably, Sánchez's speech on the steps of La Moncloa (the Spanish prime minister's residence) put international talking points at the centre of his pitch, contrasting his positions with the those of the right, and particularly US President Donald Trump and Argentinian President Javier Milei:'We have strived to build a better world for our fellow citizens and for the rest of humanity,' he said, 'supporting Ukraine, the European Union, and the United Nations in their darkest moments. Denouncing genocidal regimes when others remained silent.'Fighting tyrants, techno-oligarchs, and speculators who want to destroy the future of our sons and daughters to enlarge their pockets. Doubling our aid to international cooperation while others boasted of cutting it with their chainsaw or on that military altar of 5 per cent of GDP.'Spain's voting system50 days of intense campaigning and negotiation between parties will now follow. These negotiations matter because of Spain's electoral system. Spain uses the D'Hondt method in provincial constituencies, which punishes parties polling in low single figures. Small parties can survive by running together on a joint list, but past attempts have had mixed results. Sumar is the largest of these groupings. Despite having no leader, it has launched 'Frente Amplio' (the Broad Front) to try to pull support together. Much will depend on the firebrand MP Gabriel Rufián. He is seen as a potential unifier of the fragmented parties to the left of PSOE. But he is not a Sumar figure, and internal politics and personalities have a habit of wrecking electoral pacts in Spain. Podemos, PSOE's coalition partner, joined Sumar's list in 2023 but broke away within months. For Sánchez, what happens to his left matters more than ever. His pitch therefore needs to be binary. For Sánchez, what happens to his left matters more than ever. His pitch therefore needs to be binary. Expect him to use Trump, Milei and Flávio Bolsonaro (ahead in Brazil's presidential race after the first round) as bogeymen to focus minds even before the ballots are printed.On the right, the Partido Popular (PP) will likely approach a 'Ming Vase strategy' of trying to just get through the next 50 days without any major mishaps. It is not clear that this can work. Questions about what a coalition with Vox would look like will follow their leader Alberto Feijóo. His inability to respond adequately to such questions in 2023 likely cost him victory. Spain's vote will now be the first in a series of crucial European elections. France chooses a new president in spring 2027. Italy, Poland, Finland and Greece are due to vote before the year is out. Many of these contests will look like Spain's, as fragile coalitions on the left will face a confident and surging right. The results will matter well beyond domestic politics. This campaign will be closely followed across the continent – and from across the Atlantic – as politicians seek to perfect their pitch in ever more polarized times.

Nepal's floods put the global loss and damage system to the test Nepal's floods put the global loss and damage system to the test Expert comment jon.wallace 5 October 2026 Nepal's recovery from August's catastrophic glacial flood will test the efficiency of the UN's Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage. It will also resurface questions about the responsibilities of the greatest carbon emitters. On 26 August 2026, a glacial disaster high in the Himalayas sent a wall of meltwater and debris tearing through Nepal's Bhotekoshi and Rasuwa region at speeds of nearly 188 km per hour. The flood has claimed over 1400 lives, with thousands still missing.  Nepal is experiencing the consequences of a warming cryosphere, with accelerated glacier melt that could undermine the long-term security of a water source on which millions of people depend.  The country only contributes around 0.1 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions. Yet its people are on the front lines of climate change impacts, as glacial retreat reshapes the Himalayan landscape. Early estimates of the cost of reconstruction are $4 to 5 billion, around a tenth of Nepal's GDP. Nepal's government has appealed to the UN's Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) for help. But that can only provide a fraction of the funds required. As a result, Nepal has raised the responsibility of the world's largest carbon emitters and will bring the issue to the forefront of November's COP31 climate summit in Turkey.In this respect, Nepal's recovery will stress-test bigger questions: How far is it possible to establish whether climate change was a contributing factor to a disaster? Can international climate finance mechanisms deliver urgent help to countries facing imminent, irreparable losses? And what more should the world's greatest emitters be doing to help countries like Nepal?The Fund faces a credibility testSince the FRLD was established at COP27 in 2022, demand for financial support has far exceeded available funding. As of March 2026, 27 countries pledged $822.06 million, of which only around half was received. The Fund made $342 million available in its first round, dwarfed by requests of close to $2.8 billion for losses and damages worldwide.The Fund faces disbursement delays from unreliable capital flows and institutional bottlenecks, due to unfulfilled voluntary commitments and approval processes within the World Bank. Nepal's access is also constrained by complex, multi-tiered federal approval processes and lengthy procurement procedures.At present, there is no rapid-access pathway for countries to apply for FRLD funding outside scheduled application windows. Questions also remain about how the Fund will assess the role of climate change in causing particular disasters, and how such assessments might influence funding decisions.Nepal has emerged as an early test of how the Fund will respond. Kathmandu has requested $20 million – a modest sum compared to the scale of economic damage. Yet the request is significant for what it reveals about the Fund's ability to respond in practice: Can the Fund move resources quickly and predictably enough to provide support when it is most needed?Scientific attribution Nepal's catastrophe puts attribution front and centre: how can it be established whether climate change was a contributing factor to a disaster, rather than the sole cause? If it is found to be a contributing factor, when is that sufficient to establish harm? And is it possible to apportion responsibility for global warming to greenhouse gas emissions by certain countries? Nepal is challenging established understandings of climate responsibility and raising difficult questions about who should bear the costs of climate-related losses.  Nepal is relying on a recent flood study in its claim to the Fund, attributing several cascading climate factors to the onset of this catastrophe. This should make Nepal's case for loss and damage straightforward. The harm is tangible, the science exists, and the FRLD was built for this scenario. But a fund capped at $20 million per project is facing a disaster impact estimated in billions. That may push Nepal to look past the Fund's limits to the countries whose emissions may have contributed to these harms. In July 2025, the International Court of Justice's Advisory Opinion on Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change offered a real, if partial, legal scaffolding to claims that states suffering climate-related harm may seek address, a development relevant to Nepal's application to the FRLD. On establishing harm, the Court accepted that climate science can be relied upon to link specific disasters to climate change. A 'sufficiently direct and certain' standard was set to accommodate the complexity of determining causality in climate events. Responding to losses and damages Speaking at the UN General Assembly last Friday, Nepal's Prime Minister Balendra Shah argued that the FRLD and other mechanisms remain 'grossly inadequate' for countries like his, which contributed little to warming of the Himalayan climate. This followed calls by his foreign minister for major emitters to work together to help vulnerable and small economies like Nepal. By seeking support from major emitters across developed and developing countries, Nepal is challenging established understandings of climate responsibility and raising difficult questions about who should bear the costs of climate-related losses.  Want to hear more on the path to a secure energy transition? Join us at our climate and energy summit, where policymakers and industry leaders tackle the toughest questions on climate and energy security. Though politically significant, translating that into an international financing obligation will be difficult. While China and India's present-day emissions are substantial, India's per capita emissions and both their historical contributions are low relative to other advanced economies. Both are considered developing countries under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and argue for differentiated responsibilities to developed countries like the United States under Article 2 (2) of the Paris Agreement. Meanwhile, the US withdrawal from UNFCCC creates financial, governance and diplomatic challenges ahead of COP31. However, both China and India have significant interests in Nepalese recovery. Both invest heavily in infrastructure development in the ecologically fragile region, while India relies on Nepal's hydropower. And both countries' proximity to Nepal creates shared priorities in Himalayan resilience. Furthermore, their responsibilities to address climate change can evolve as domestic capabilities and emission profiles grow, also helping to strengthen south-south cooperation. Addressing Nepal's losses and damages therefore provides a strategic and humanitarian imperative, requiring a collective response to rebuild Nepal. COP31: The next test Questions of attribution and compensation are best left outside of negotiation rooms to appropriate legal forums. Instead, Nepal's experience points to three priorities at this year's COP31 summit. First, clearer standards are needed for attributing harm where multiple factors have contributed to a disaster. Second, more consistent approaches are required for establishing the value of economic and non-economic losses in cases like Nepal's. Third, access to FRLD finance should be faster and more predictable. The political context will make progress difficult. COP31 comes amid geopolitical fragmentation, fiscal pressures and growing strain on multilateral cooperation. At the same time, some progress may be in sight. Loss and damage is formally on the agenda, including guidance to the FRLD, while the Fund prepares for its first funding decisions. Some scope for regional cooperation may remain, as illustrated by Prime Minister Shah's proposal at the UN for a Himalayan Climate Resilience Mechanism between Nepal, India and China to share glacial-lake data and strengthen joint early-warning systems.  Overall, Nepal's application will provide a practical test of whether COP31 can move beyond broad commitments on loss and damage towards clearer rules for climate attribution, assessment and access to finance. The immediate opportunity may be incremental rather than transformational. Negotiators will need to establish processes that can be strengthened over time, while ensuring that disputes over responsibility do not prevent vulnerable countries receiving the support they need. However, more cases like Nepal's will follow. And the need for a just solution to help countries recover from such disasters will only grow.

Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Audio sseth.drupal@c… 2 October 2026 On this weeks episode of Independent Thinking, our experts discuss what Houthi control of the Bab al-Mandab strait means for the wider region. The Iranian-backed Houthi rebels capture of Yemens port city of Mocha means that Iran now effectively controls two crucial waterways in the region – the Bab al-Mandab Strait to the Red Sea and thus the Suez Canal, as well as the Hormuz Strait. Why has this simmering conflict exploded again? What do Iran and the Houthis want? How serious is this potential blockade for world trade and energy supply? And could the Houthis become a regional power, in economic terms even more powerful than Iran?Bronwen Maddox is joined by director of Chatham Houses Middle East and North Africa Programme, Dr Sanam Vakil; Horn of Africa specialist Ahmed Soliman; and Yemen and Gulf specialist, Farea Al-Muslimi, who joins us from Jordan.

Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Audio sseth.drupal@c… 2 October 2026 On this weeks episode of Independent Thinking, our experts discuss what Houthi control of the Bab al-Mandab strait means for the wider region. The Iranian-backed Houthi rebels capture of Yemens port city of Mocha means that Iran now effectively controls two crucial waterways in the region – the Bab al-Mandab Strait to the Red Sea and thus the Suez Canal, as well as the Hormuz Strait. Why has this simmering conflict exploded again? What do Iran and the Houthis want? How serious is this potential blockade for world trade and energy supply? And could the Houthis become a regional power, in economic terms even more powerful than Iran?Bronwen Maddox is joined by director of Chatham Houses Middle East and North Africa Programme, Dr Sanam Vakil; Horn of Africa specialist Ahmed Soliman; and Yemen and Gulf specialist, Farea Al-Muslimi, who joins us from Jordan.

Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Audio sseth.drupal@c… 2 October 2026 On this weeks episode of Independent Thinking, our experts discuss what Houthi control of the Bab al-Mandab strait means for the wider region. The Iranian-backed Houthi rebels capture of Yemens port city of Mocha means that Iran now effectively controls two crucial waterways in the region – the Bab al-Mandab Strait to the Red Sea and thus the Suez Canal, as well as the Hormuz Strait. Why has this simmering conflict exploded again? What do Iran and the Houthis want? How serious is this potential blockade for world trade and energy supply? And could the Houthis become a regional power, in economic terms even more powerful than Iran?Bronwen Maddox is joined by director of Chatham Houses Middle East and North Africa Programme, Dr Sanam Vakil; Horn of Africa specialist Ahmed Soliman; and Yemen and Gulf specialist, Farea Al-Muslimi, who joins us from Jordan.

Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Audio sseth.drupal@c… 2 October 2026 On this weeks episode of Independent Thinking, our experts discuss what Houthi control of the Bab al-Mandab strait means for the wider region. The Iranian-backed Houthi rebels capture of Yemens port city of Mocha means that Iran now effectively controls two crucial waterways in the region – the Bab al-Mandab Strait to the Red Sea and thus the Suez Canal, as well as the Hormuz Strait. Why has this simmering conflict exploded again? What do Iran and the Houthis want? How serious is this potential blockade for world trade and energy supply? And could the Houthis become a regional power, in economic terms even more powerful than Iran?Bronwen Maddox is joined by director of Chatham Houses Middle East and North Africa Programme, Dr Sanam Vakil; Horn of Africa specialist Ahmed Soliman; and Yemen and Gulf specialist, Farea Al-Muslimi, who joins us from Jordan.

Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Audio sseth.drupal@c… 2 October 2026 On this weeks episode of Independent Thinking, our experts discuss what Houthi control of the Bab al-Mandab strait means for the wider region. The Iranian-backed Houthi rebels capture of Yemens port city of Mocha means that Iran now effectively controls two crucial waterways in the region – the Bab al-Mandab Strait to the Red Sea and thus the Suez Canal, as well as the Hormuz Strait. Why has this simmering conflict exploded again? What do Iran and the Houthis want? How serious is this potential blockade for world trade and energy supply? And could the Houthis become a regional power, in economic terms even more powerful than Iran?Bronwen Maddox is joined by director of Chatham Houses Middle East and North Africa Programme, Dr Sanam Vakil; Horn of Africa specialist Ahmed Soliman; and Yemen and Gulf specialist, Farea Al-Muslimi, who joins us from Jordan.

Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Audio sseth.drupal@c… 2 October 2026 On this weeks episode of Independent Thinking, our experts discuss what Houthi control of the Bab al-Mandab strait means for the wider region. The Iranian-backed Houthi rebels capture of Yemens port city of Mocha means that Iran now effectively controls two crucial waterways in the region – the Bab al-Mandab Strait to the Red Sea and thus the Suez Canal, as well as the Hormuz Strait. Why has this simmering conflict exploded again? What do Iran and the Houthis want? How serious is this potential blockade for world trade and energy supply? And could the Houthis become a regional power, in economic terms even more powerful than Iran?Bronwen Maddox is joined by director of Chatham Houses Middle East and North Africa Programme, Dr Sanam Vakil; Horn of Africa specialist Ahmed Soliman; and Yemen and Gulf specialist, Farea Al-Muslimi, who joins us from Jordan.

Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Audio sseth.drupal@c… 2 October 2026 On this weeks episode of Independent Thinking, our experts discuss what Houthi control of the Bab al-Mandab strait means for the wider region. The Iranian-backed Houthi rebels capture of Yemens port city of Mocha means that Iran now effectively controls two crucial waterways in the region – the Bab al-Mandab Strait to the Red Sea and thus the Suez Canal, as well as the Hormuz Strait. Why has this simmering conflict exploded again? What do Iran and the Houthis want? How serious is this potential blockade for world trade and energy supply? And could the Houthis become a regional power, in economic terms even more powerful than Iran?Bronwen Maddox is joined by director of Chatham Houses Middle East and North Africa Programme, Dr Sanam Vakil; Horn of Africa specialist Ahmed Soliman; and Yemen and Gulf specialist, Farea Al-Muslimi, who joins us from Jordan.

Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Audio sseth.drupal@c… 2 October 2026 On this weeks episode of Independent Thinking, our experts discuss what Houthi control of the Bab al-Mandab strait means for the wider region. The Iranian-backed Houthi rebels capture of Yemens port city of Mocha means that Iran now effectively controls two crucial waterways in the region – the Bab al-Mandab Strait to the Red Sea and thus the Suez Canal, as well as the Hormuz Strait. Why has this simmering conflict exploded again? What do Iran and the Houthis want? How serious is this potential blockade for world trade and energy supply? And could the Houthis become a regional power, in economic terms even more powerful than Iran?Bronwen Maddox is joined by director of Chatham Houses Middle East and North Africa Programme, Dr Sanam Vakil; Horn of Africa specialist Ahmed Soliman; and Yemen and Gulf specialist, Farea Al-Muslimi, who joins us from Jordan.

Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Audio sseth.drupal@c… 2 October 2026 On this weeks episode of Independent Thinking, our experts discuss what Houthi control of the Bab al-Mandab strait means for the wider region. The Iranian-backed Houthi rebels capture of Yemens port city of Mocha means that Iran now effectively controls two crucial waterways in the region – the Bab al-Mandab Strait to the Red Sea and thus the Suez Canal, as well as the Hormuz Strait. Why has this simmering conflict exploded again? What do Iran and the Houthis want? How serious is this potential blockade for world trade and energy supply? And could the Houthis become a regional power, in economic terms even more powerful than Iran?Bronwen Maddox is joined by director of Chatham Houses Middle East and North Africa Programme, Dr Sanam Vakil; Horn of Africa specialist Ahmed Soliman; and Yemen and Gulf specialist, Farea Al-Muslimi, who joins us from Jordan.

Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Audio sseth.drupal@c… 2 October 2026 On this weeks episode of Independent Thinking, our experts discuss what Houthi control of the Bab al-Mandab strait means for the wider region. The Iranian-backed Houthi rebels capture of Yemens port city of Mocha means that Iran now effectively controls two crucial waterways in the region – the Bab al-Mandab Strait to the Red Sea and thus the Suez Canal, as well as the Hormuz Strait. Why has this simmering conflict exploded again? What do Iran and the Houthis want? How serious is this potential blockade for world trade and energy supply? And could the Houthis become a regional power, in economic terms even more powerful than Iran?Bronwen Maddox is joined by director of Chatham Houses Middle East and North Africa Programme, Dr Sanam Vakil; Horn of Africa specialist Ahmed Soliman; and Yemen and Gulf specialist, Farea Al-Muslimi, who joins us from Jordan.

Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Audio sseth.drupal@c… 2 October 2026 On this weeks episode of Independent Thinking, our experts discuss what Houthi control of the Bab al-Mandab strait means for the wider region. The Iranian-backed Houthi rebels capture of Yemens port city of Mocha means that Iran now effectively controls two crucial waterways in the region – the Bab al-Mandab Strait to the Red Sea and thus the Suez Canal, as well as the Hormuz Strait. Why has this simmering conflict exploded again? What do Iran and the Houthis want? How serious is this potential blockade for world trade and energy supply? And could the Houthis become a regional power, in economic terms even more powerful than Iran?Bronwen Maddox is joined by director of Chatham Houses Middle East and North Africa Programme, Dr Sanam Vakil; Horn of Africa specialist Ahmed Soliman; and Yemen and Gulf specialist, Farea Al-Muslimi, who joins us from Jordan.

Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Audio sseth.drupal@c… 2 October 2026 On this weeks episode of Independent Thinking, our experts discuss what Houthi control of the Bab al-Mandab strait means for the wider region. The Iranian-backed Houthi rebels capture of Yemens port city of Mocha means that Iran now effectively controls two crucial waterways in the region – the Bab al-Mandab Strait to the Red Sea and thus the Suez Canal, as well as the Hormuz Strait. Why has this simmering conflict exploded again? What do Iran and the Houthis want? How serious is this potential blockade for world trade and energy supply? And could the Houthis become a regional power, in economic terms even more powerful than Iran?Bronwen Maddox is joined by director of Chatham Houses Middle East and North Africa Programme, Dr Sanam Vakil; Horn of Africa specialist Ahmed Soliman; and Yemen and Gulf specialist, Farea Al-Muslimi, who joins us from Jordan.

Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Audio sseth.drupal@c… 2 October 2026 On this weeks episode of Independent Thinking, our experts discuss what Houthi control of the Bab al-Mandab strait means for the wider region. The Iranian-backed Houthi rebels capture of Yemens port city of Mocha means that Iran now effectively controls two crucial waterways in the region – the Bab al-Mandab Strait to the Red Sea and thus the Suez Canal, as well as the Hormuz Strait. Why has this simmering conflict exploded again? What do Iran and the Houthis want? How serious is this potential blockade for world trade and energy supply? And could the Houthis become a regional power, in economic terms even more powerful than Iran?Bronwen Maddox is joined by director of Chatham Houses Middle East and North Africa Programme, Dr Sanam Vakil; Horn of Africa specialist Ahmed Soliman; and Yemen and Gulf specialist, Farea Al-Muslimi, who joins us from Jordan.

Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Audio sseth.drupal@c… 2 October 2026 On this weeks episode of Independent Thinking, our experts discuss what Houthi control of the Bab al-Mandab strait means for the wider region. The Iranian-backed Houthi rebels capture of Yemens port city of Mocha means that Iran now effectively controls two crucial waterways in the region – the Bab al-Mandab Strait to the Red Sea and thus the Suez Canal, as well as the Hormuz Strait. Why has this simmering conflict exploded again? What do Iran and the Houthis want? How serious is this potential blockade for world trade and energy supply? And could the Houthis become a regional power, in economic terms even more powerful than Iran?Bronwen Maddox is joined by director of Chatham Houses Middle East and North Africa Programme, Dr Sanam Vakil; Horn of Africa specialist Ahmed Soliman; and Yemen and Gulf specialist, Farea Al-Muslimi, who joins us from Jordan.

Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Audio sseth.drupal@c… 2 October 2026 On this weeks episode of Independent Thinking, our experts discuss what Houthi control of the Bab al-Mandab strait means for the wider region. The Iranian-backed Houthi rebels capture of Yemens port city of Mocha means that Iran now effectively controls two crucial waterways in the region – the Bab al-Mandab Strait to the Red Sea and thus the Suez Canal, as well as the Hormuz Strait. Why has this simmering conflict exploded again? What do Iran and the Houthis want? How serious is this potential blockade for world trade and energy supply? And could the Houthis become a regional power, in economic terms even more powerful than Iran?Bronwen Maddox is joined by director of Chatham Houses Middle East and North Africa Programme, Dr Sanam Vakil; Horn of Africa specialist Ahmed Soliman; and Yemen and Gulf specialist, Farea Al-Muslimi, who joins us from Jordan.

Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Audio sseth.drupal@c… 2 October 2026 On this weeks episode of Independent Thinking, our experts discuss what Houthi control of the Bab al-Mandab strait means for the wider region. The Iranian-backed Houthi rebels capture of Yemens port city of Mocha means that Iran now effectively controls two crucial waterways in the region – the Bab al-Mandab Strait to the Red Sea and thus the Suez Canal, as well as the Hormuz Strait. Why has this simmering conflict exploded again? What do Iran and the Houthis want? How serious is this potential blockade for world trade and energy supply? And could the Houthis become a regional power, in economic terms even more powerful than Iran?Bronwen Maddox is joined by director of Chatham Houses Middle East and North Africa Programme, Dr Sanam Vakil; Horn of Africa specialist Ahmed Soliman; and Yemen and Gulf specialist, Farea Al-Muslimi, who joins us from Jordan.

Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Audio sseth.drupal@c… 2 October 2026 On this weeks episode of Independent Thinking, our experts discuss what Houthi control of the Bab al-Mandab strait means for the wider region. The Iranian-backed Houthi rebels capture of Yemens port city of Mocha means that Iran now effectively controls two crucial waterways in the region – the Bab al-Mandab Strait to the Red Sea and thus the Suez Canal, as well as the Hormuz Strait. Why has this simmering conflict exploded again? What do Iran and the Houthis want? How serious is this potential blockade for world trade and energy supply? And could the Houthis become a regional power, in economic terms even more powerful than Iran?Bronwen Maddox is joined by director of Chatham Houses Middle East and North Africa Programme, Dr Sanam Vakil; Horn of Africa specialist Ahmed Soliman; and Yemen and Gulf specialist, Farea Al-Muslimi, who joins us from Jordan.

Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Audio sseth.drupal@c… 2 October 2026 On this weeks episode of Independent Thinking, our experts discuss what Houthi control of the Bab al-Mandab strait means for the wider region. The Iranian-backed Houthi rebels capture of Yemens port city of Mocha means that Iran now effectively controls two crucial waterways in the region – the Bab al-Mandab Strait to the Red Sea and thus the Suez Canal, as well as the Hormuz Strait. Why has this simmering conflict exploded again? What do Iran and the Houthis want? How serious is this potential blockade for world trade and energy supply? And could the Houthis become a regional power, in economic terms even more powerful than Iran?Bronwen Maddox is joined by director of Chatham Houses Middle East and North Africa Programme, Dr Sanam Vakil; Horn of Africa specialist Ahmed Soliman; and Yemen and Gulf specialist, Farea Al-Muslimi, who joins us from Jordan.

Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Why the Houthis Red Sea power play makes Iran even stronger Audio sseth.drupal@c… 2 October 2026 On this weeks episode of Independent Thinking, our experts discuss what Houthi control of the Bab al-Mandab strait means for the wider region. The Iranian-backed Houthi rebels capture of Yemens port city of Mocha means that Iran now effectively controls two crucial waterways in the region – the Bab al-Mandab Strait to the Red Sea and thus the Suez Canal, as well as the Hormuz Strait. Why has this simmering conflict exploded again? What do Iran and the Houthis want? How serious is this potential blockade for world trade and energy supply? And could the Houthis become a regional power, in economic terms even more powerful than Iran?Bronwen Maddox is joined by director of Chatham Houses Middle East and North Africa Programme, Dr Sanam Vakil; Horn of Africa specialist Ahmed Soliman; and Yemen and Gulf specialist, Farea Al-Muslimi, who joins us from Jordan.

War has returned to Tigray. This time it may not stay in Ethiopia War has returned to Tigray. This time it may not stay in Ethiopia Expert comment LToremark 1 October 2026 As fighting escalates in Tigray and neighbouring areas, there are fears that Ethiopias internal instability could spill over into the wider Horn of Africa region. Conflict returned to Ethiopias northern region of Tigray on 23 September, as the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) forces stormed three national airports in Tigray. In what the TPLF claimed was defensive combat, ground offensives were also expanded along Tigrays southern and eastern borders with the neighbouring Amhara and Afar regions. The TPLF and its allies captured parts of Afar but lost several key areas in southern Tigray, including Alamata town.Ethiopias federal government forces and the allied Tigray Peace Force (TPF) are now advancing towards Mekelle, the capital of Tigray. Meanwhile, reports of drone strikes in Addis Ababa and on government-controlled airbases alters the nature of the war.Although Tigray has seen conflict before, this time there is a risk that hostilities could extend into Eritrea and Sudan.The slow creep towards renewed conflict Related work Ethiopia needs more than an election to calm internal and regional conflict The risk of renewed hostilities in Tigray had been clear for some time, given the steady decline in relations between the federal government and the TPLF. The failure to build on the Pretoria Agreement – the ceasefire deal that brought an end to the war in 2022 – was largely the result of a continued zero-sum approach by both sides, as well as weak implementation and oversight.The agreement effectively unravelled in May, when the TPLF reinstated a pre-war legislative council, with its chairman Debretsion Gebremichael named regional president. This spelled the end of the Tigray Interim Regional Administration (TIRA) – a key outcome negotiated under Pretoria. The removal of interim president, General Tadesse Werede, formerly head of the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF), followed the ouster of his predecessor Getachew Reda in late 2024.The TPLF views the recent escalation as a return to full-scale war. To an extent, they have been pushed towards a response. There is continued containment of Tigray; a lack of implementation of the Pretoria Agreement or any dispute resolution mechanism; the absence of incentives for its leadership to return to the federal fold; a weakening of TPLF legitimacy in the region; and recent drone attacks by the government in the region.But unlike in the 2020–22 war, the federal government has been more cautious and calculated in its actions as well as public messaging. The government frames the TPLF as a rogue administration that is colluding with internal opposition insurgencies and external actors to threaten Ethiopias territorial integrity and its own survival.The key question now is whether the government will seek to contain the conflict within Tigray and other parts of northern Ethiopia, or whether it will consider it necessary to pursue bolder options. One such option could be targeting Eritrea, which it believes to be supporting anti-government movements – something Eritrea has repeatedly denied. In a message assigning culpability to its northern neighbour, Ethiopia closed its embassy in Eritrea and expelled Eritrean diplomats.Now, much will depend on how the conflict evolves.Internal division in Tigray and a new opposition allianceThe TPLFs control over Tigrayan society has weakened significantly. Since the war ended in 2022, it has faced protests over crippling economic conditions, growing competition from rival parties and defections by leading members. In recent months, Tigrayan authorities have turned to forcibly recruiting young men into the defence forces and have cracked down on freedom of speech. For the people of Tigray, an already difficult humanitarian situation now looks set to worsen. There is deep division within TPLF too. Following the start of the military offensive, there have been reports of senior TPLF officials being arrested or defecting to Addis Ababa.Days before the fighting resumed, the TPLF and six other regional armed opposition groups – including Amharas Fano movement and the Oromia regions Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) – announced a coalition called the Alliance for Survival. Their common goal is to remove Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and his Prosperity Party from power and install a transitional government.But it is not immediately clear that this uneasy tactical alliance – among groups with unresolved tensions and very different visions for Ethiopia – will result in functional cooperation. Senior leaders of Fano have publicly opposed the alliance; while a recently divided OLA may struggle with justification to its support base. There are also historical grievances between some of these groups. The TPLF have accused Fano and the Eritrean forces of grave human rights violations in Tigray four years ago, while Fano and OLA have been bitter and at times violent enemies.Risk of regional spillover Related work De-escalation is needed to prevent Ethiopia and Eritrea from going to war Opposition to the Ethiopian government also comes from beyond the countrys borders. Tsimdo is a transnational alliance which reportedly links the TPLF, the Eritrean government and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).The TPLF is silently allied with its former foe, Eritrea, with supply lines chiefly secured through Tigrays northern border. But the Eritrean governments priority is to keep war away from its own territory, and its alleged support for opposition groups increases the risk of further regional escalation – especially with Ethiopia eyeing control over Eritreas Red Sea port of Assab.Meanwhile, the conflicts in Ethiopia and Sudan have also become more intertwined. The Ethiopian government has accused the SAF of backing the TPLF – which they have denied – and is increasingly unsettled by the reported presence of Tigrayan fighters alongside the SAF in eastern Sudan. It fears that the SAF, in collaboration with Eritrea, could reinforce the TPLF from across the Sudanese border – including near strategic sites like the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.Sudan, in turn, has accused Ethiopia of providing support for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Sudan Peoples Liberation-North (SPLM-N), including training, supplies and use of Ethiopian territory. Ethiopias close ally, the UAE, is also accused of supporting the RSF – although it refutes such allegations. Ethiopias calculus is seemingly to create a buffer on its border with Sudan. However, direct dialogue and de-escalation with the SAF would go further than retaliatory exchanges and mutual accusations of interference.Limited options for de-escalation  The mediation landscape is very different from 2022. Members of the international community have called out the TPLF for their escalatory actions and urged a return to African Union (AU)-led talks. The Ethiopian government has so far controlled the narrative around this conflict, briefing foreign governments about the likely escalation ahead of the UN General Assembly.The Pretoria Agreement did not produce the broader political settlement needed for durable peace and no longer seems tenable for either side. The TPLF has repeatedly discredited the only existing mediation effort under the AU. Hardening regional rivalries and the lack of US or wider Western interest to fully support the AU with the resources and leverage needed to create a viable platform, makes a sustainable resolution to this conflict seem a long way off.Given these conditions, the conflict is likely to continue for a while. However, the danger of diplomatic inaction is that a protracted war in Tigray is likely to spill over beyond Ethiopia, into Eritrea and further into Sudan. Policymakers must find a way to take collective action to avert such a dangerous regional escalation.

War has returned to Tigray. This time it may not stay in Ethiopia War has returned to Tigray. This time it may not stay in Ethiopia Expert comment LToremark 1 October 2026 As fighting escalates in Tigray and neighbouring areas, there are fears that Ethiopias internal instability could spill over into the wider Horn of Africa region. Conflict returned to Ethiopias northern region of Tigray on 23 September, as the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) forces stormed three national airports in Tigray. In what the TPLF claimed was defensive combat, ground offensives were also expanded along Tigrays southern and eastern borders with the neighbouring Amhara and Afar regions. The TPLF and its allies captured parts of Afar but lost several key areas in southern Tigray, including Alamata town.Ethiopias federal government forces and the allied Tigray Peace Force (TPF) are now advancing towards Mekelle, the capital of Tigray. Meanwhile, reports of drone strikes in Addis Ababa and on government-controlled airbases alters the nature of the war.Although Tigray has seen conflict before, this time there is a risk that hostilities could extend into Eritrea and Sudan.The slow creep towards renewed conflict Related work Ethiopia needs more than an election to calm internal and regional conflict The risk of renewed hostilities in Tigray had been clear for some time, given the steady decline in relations between the federal government and the TPLF. The failure to build on the Pretoria Agreement – the ceasefire deal that brought an end to the war in 2022 – was largely the result of a continued zero-sum approach by both sides, as well as weak implementation and oversight.The agreement effectively unravelled in May, when the TPLF reinstated a pre-war legislative council, with its chairman Debretsion Gebremichael named regional president. This spelled the end of the Tigray Interim Regional Administration (TIRA) – a key outcome negotiated under Pretoria. The removal of interim president, General Tadesse Werede, formerly head of the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF), followed the ouster of his predecessor Getachew Reda in late 2024.The TPLF views the recent escalation as a return to full-scale war. To an extent, they have been pushed towards a response. There is continued containment of Tigray; a lack of implementation of the Pretoria Agreement or any dispute resolution mechanism; the absence of incentives for its leadership to return to the federal fold; a weakening of TPLF legitimacy in the region; and recent drone attacks by the government in the region.But unlike in the 2020–22 war, the federal government has been more cautious and calculated in its actions as well as public messaging. The government frames the TPLF as a rogue administration that is colluding with internal opposition insurgencies and external actors to threaten Ethiopias territorial integrity and its own survival.The key question now is whether the government will seek to contain the conflict within Tigray and other parts of northern Ethiopia, or whether it will consider it necessary to pursue bolder options. One such option could be targeting Eritrea, which it believes to be supporting anti-government movements – something Eritrea has repeatedly denied. In a message assigning culpability to its northern neighbour, Ethiopia closed its embassy in Eritrea and expelled Eritrean diplomats.Now, much will depend on how the conflict evolves.Internal division in Tigray and a new opposition allianceThe TPLFs control over Tigrayan society has weakened significantly. Since the war ended in 2022, it has faced protests over crippling economic conditions, growing competition from rival parties and defections by leading members. In recent months, Tigrayan authorities have turned to forcibly recruiting young men into the defence forces and have cracked down on freedom of speech. For the people of Tigray, an already difficult humanitarian situation now looks set to worsen. There is deep division within TPLF too. Following the start of the military offensive, there have been reports of senior TPLF officials being arrested or defecting to Addis Ababa.Days before the fighting resumed, the TPLF and six other regional armed opposition groups – including Amharas Fano movement and the Oromia regions Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) – announced a coalition called the Alliance for Survival. Their common goal is to remove Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and his Prosperity Party from power and install a transitional government.But it is not immediately clear that this uneasy tactical alliance – among groups with unresolved tensions and very different visions for Ethiopia – will result in functional cooperation. Senior leaders of Fano have publicly opposed the alliance; while a recently divided OLA may struggle with justification to its support base. There are also historical grievances between some of these groups. The TPLF have accused Fano and the Eritrean forces of grave human rights violations in Tigray four years ago, while Fano and OLA have been bitter and at times violent enemies.Risk of regional spillover Related work De-escalation is needed to prevent Ethiopia and Eritrea from going to war Opposition to the Ethiopian government also comes from beyond the countrys borders. Tsimdo is a transnational alliance which reportedly links the TPLF, the Eritrean government and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).The TPLF is silently allied with its former foe, Eritrea, with supply lines chiefly secured through Tigrays northern border. But the Eritrean governments priority is to keep war away from its own territory, and its alleged support for opposition groups increases the risk of further regional escalation – especially with Ethiopia eyeing control over Eritreas Red Sea port of Assab.Meanwhile, the conflicts in Ethiopia and Sudan have also become more intertwined. The Ethiopian government has accused the SAF of backing the TPLF – which they have denied – and is increasingly unsettled by the reported presence of Tigrayan fighters alongside the SAF in eastern Sudan. It fears that the SAF, in collaboration with Eritrea, could reinforce the TPLF from across the Sudanese border – including near strategic sites like the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.Sudan, in turn, has accused Ethiopia of providing support for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Sudan Peoples Liberation-North (SPLM-N), including training, supplies and use of Ethiopian territory. Ethiopias close ally, the UAE, is also accused of supporting the RSF – although it refutes such allegations. Ethiopias calculus is seemingly to create a buffer on its border with Sudan. However, direct dialogue and de-escalation with the SAF would go further than retaliatory exchanges and mutual accusations of interference.Limited options for de-escalation  The mediation landscape is very different from 2022. Members of the international community have called out the TPLF for their escalatory actions and urged a return to African Union (AU)-led talks. The Ethiopian government has so far controlled the narrative around this conflict, briefing foreign governments about the likely escalation ahead of the UN General Assembly.The Pretoria Agreement did not produce the broader political settlement needed for durable peace and no longer seems tenable for either side. The TPLF has repeatedly discredited the only existing mediation effort under the AU. Hardening regional rivalries and the lack of US or wider Western interest to fully support the AU with the resources and leverage needed to create a viable platform, makes a sustainable resolution to this conflict seem a long way off.Given these conditions, the conflict is likely to continue for a while. However, the danger of diplomatic inaction is that a protracted war in Tigray is likely to spill over beyond Ethiopia, into Eritrea and further into Sudan. Policymakers must find a way to take collective action to avert such a dangerous regional escalation.

War has returned to Tigray. This time it may not stay in Ethiopia War has returned to Tigray. This time it may not stay in Ethiopia Expert comment LToremark 1 October 2026 As fighting escalates in Tigray and neighbouring areas, there are fears that Ethiopias internal instability could spill over into the wider Horn of Africa region. Conflict returned to Ethiopias northern region of Tigray on 23 September, as the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) forces stormed three national airports in Tigray. In what the TPLF claimed was defensive combat, ground offensives were also expanded along Tigrays southern and eastern borders with the neighbouring Amhara and Afar regions. The TPLF and its allies captured parts of Afar but lost several key areas in southern Tigray, including Alamata town.Ethiopias federal government forces and the allied Tigray Peace Force (TPF) are now advancing towards Mekelle, the capital of Tigray. Meanwhile, reports of drone strikes in Addis Ababa and on government-controlled airbases alters the nature of the war.Although Tigray has seen conflict before, this time there is a risk that hostilities could extend into Eritrea and Sudan.The slow creep towards renewed conflict Related work Ethiopia needs more than an election to calm internal and regional conflict The risk of renewed hostilities in Tigray had been clear for some time, given the steady decline in relations between the federal government and the TPLF. The failure to build on the Pretoria Agreement – the ceasefire deal that brought an end to the war in 2022 – was largely the result of a continued zero-sum approach by both sides, as well as weak implementation and oversight.The agreement effectively unravelled in May, when the TPLF reinstated a pre-war legislative council, with its chairman Debretsion Gebremichael named regional president. This spelled the end of the Tigray Interim Regional Administration (TIRA) – a key outcome negotiated under Pretoria. The removal of interim president, General Tadesse Werede, formerly head of the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF), followed the ouster of his predecessor Getachew Reda in late 2024.The TPLF views the recent escalation as a return to full-scale war. To an extent, they have been pushed towards a response. There is continued containment of Tigray; a lack of implementation of the Pretoria Agreement or any dispute resolution mechanism; the absence of incentives for its leadership to return to the federal fold; a weakening of TPLF legitimacy in the region; and recent drone attacks by the government in the region.But unlike in the 2020–22 war, the federal government has been more cautious and calculated in its actions as well as public messaging. The government frames the TPLF as a rogue administration that is colluding with internal opposition insurgencies and external actors to threaten Ethiopias territorial integrity and its own survival.The key question now is whether the government will seek to contain the conflict within Tigray and other parts of northern Ethiopia, or whether it will consider it necessary to pursue bolder options. One such option could be targeting Eritrea, which it believes to be supporting anti-government movements – something Eritrea has repeatedly denied. In a message assigning culpability to its northern neighbour, Ethiopia closed its embassy in Eritrea and expelled Eritrean diplomats.Now, much will depend on how the conflict evolves.Internal division in Tigray and a new opposition allianceThe TPLFs control over Tigrayan society has weakened significantly. Since the war ended in 2022, it has faced protests over crippling economic conditions, growing competition from rival parties and defections by leading members. In recent months, Tigrayan authorities have turned to forcibly recruiting young men into the defence forces and have cracked down on freedom of speech. For the people of Tigray, an already difficult humanitarian situation now looks set to worsen. There is deep division within TPLF too. Following the start of the military offensive, there have been reports of senior TPLF officials being arrested or defecting to Addis Ababa.Days before the fighting resumed, the TPLF and six other regional armed opposition groups – including Amharas Fano movement and the Oromia regions Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) – announced a coalition called the Alliance for Survival. Their common goal is to remove Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and his Prosperity Party from power and install a transitional government.But it is not immediately clear that this uneasy tactical alliance – among groups with unresolved tensions and very different visions for Ethiopia – will result in functional cooperation. Senior leaders of Fano have publicly opposed the alliance; while a recently divided OLA may struggle with justification to its support base. There are also historical grievances between some of these groups. The TPLF have accused Fano and the Eritrean forces of grave human rights violations in Tigray four years ago, while Fano and OLA have been bitter and at times violent enemies.Risk of regional spillover Related work De-escalation is needed to prevent Ethiopia and Eritrea from going to war Opposition to the Ethiopian government also comes from beyond the countrys borders. Tsimdo is a transnational alliance which reportedly links the TPLF, the Eritrean government and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).The TPLF is silently allied with its former foe, Eritrea, with supply lines chiefly secured through Tigrays northern border. But the Eritrean governments priority is to keep war away from its own territory, and its alleged support for opposition groups increases the risk of further regional escalation – especially with Ethiopia eyeing control over Eritreas Red Sea port of Assab.Meanwhile, the conflicts in Ethiopia and Sudan have also become more intertwined. The Ethiopian government has accused the SAF of backing the TPLF – which they have denied – and is increasingly unsettled by the reported presence of Tigrayan fighters alongside the SAF in eastern Sudan. It fears that the SAF, in collaboration with Eritrea, could reinforce the TPLF from across the Sudanese border – including near strategic sites like the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.Sudan, in turn, has accused Ethiopia of providing support for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Sudan Peoples Liberation-North (SPLM-N), including training, supplies and use of Ethiopian territory. Ethiopias close ally, the UAE, is also accused of supporting the RSF – although it refutes such allegations. Ethiopias calculus is seemingly to create a buffer on its border with Sudan. However, direct dialogue and de-escalation with the SAF would go further than retaliatory exchanges and mutual accusations of interference.Limited options for de-escalation  The mediation landscape is very different from 2022. Members of the international community have called out the TPLF for their escalatory actions and urged a return to African Union (AU)-led talks. The Ethiopian government has so far controlled the narrative around this conflict, briefing foreign governments about the likely escalation ahead of the UN General Assembly.The Pretoria Agreement did not produce the broader political settlement needed for durable peace and no longer seems tenable for either side. The TPLF has repeatedly discredited the only existing mediation effort under the AU. Hardening regional rivalries and the lack of US or wider Western interest to fully support the AU with the resources and leverage needed to create a viable platform, makes a sustainable resolution to this conflict seem a long way off.Given these conditions, the conflict is likely to continue for a while. However, the danger of diplomatic inaction is that a protracted war in Tigray is likely to spill over beyond Ethiopia, into Eritrea and further into Sudan. Policymakers must find a way to take collective action to avert such a dangerous regional escalation.