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Armenias election: Voters to decide on Pashinyans peace agenda Armenias election: Voters to decide on Pashinyans peace agenda Expert comment jon.wallace 27 May 2026 Armenians face a febrile campaign but feel the benefits of improved security since hostilities with Azerbaijan ended. On 7 June Armenia will hold one of its most pivotal elections since regaining independence in 1991. The vote arrives as the country is poised between a painful redefinition of its identity and a still uncertain horizon of opportunity. In 2023 Armenia definitively lost the territory of Mountainous Karabakh to Azerbaijan. The struggle to control the region was a driving force of Armenias 1990s national independence movement, and its loss deprived Armenian nationalism of a key foundation. Yet the loss of Karabakh has also loosened Russian control over Armenian foreign policy, demonstrating Moscows declining power in the South Caucasus and the limits of its patronage. Under the banner of a Real Armenia – rather than one with ambitions for wider borders – incumbent Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party are campaigning for a final peace accord with Azerbaijan. They hope to end four decades of conflict with a final renunciation of territorial claims and Armenias integration into regional connectivity. Pashinyan has also recalibrated Armenias foreign policy with a widely discussed pivot to the West – a move which has led to warnings of a Ukraine scenario from Russian President Vladimir Putin.The opposition to Pashinyan includes blocs seeking to rehabilitate ties with Russia, and smaller parties with little chance of passing the threshold to enter parliament. Polls put Civil Contract ahead of its nearest rival, the Strong Armenia bloc led by Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, with a plurality of voters onside.Many voters remain undecided. But in a mid-May poll, 45 per cent of these said they believed Armenia is moving in the right direction. Despite well-founded fears over information manipulation from abroad, Pashinyans progress is unlikely to be halted.A public endorsement of peaceAt a White House summit in August 2025 the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers initialled – but did not sign – a peace agreement in the presence of President Donald Trump. There have been no military fatalities since February 2024, and Azerbaijan and Turkey have both taken steps towards dismantling their long-standing blockade of Armenia.This unprecedented progress remains provisional. Signing the agreement depends on Armenias adoption – at Azerbaijans insistence – of a new constitution with all references to Mountainous Karabakh removed. Adopting a new constitution will require a separate referendum after the election. Related work US intervention opens new page in Armenia–Azerbaijan peace talks but challenges remain That makes this election effectively a preliminary referendum on the terms Pashinyan has negotiated and the trajectory he plans for Armenia.Armenians certainly sense the improvement in security after a decade of near-continuous frontline violence, including defeat to Azerbaijan in 2020s war, an Azerbaijani offensive on Armenias territory in September 2022, and Bakus military incorporation of Karabakh in September 2023. The need to come to lasting terms with Baku is widely recognized. But the loss of Karabakh has left severe fractures in Armenias body politic.These have surfaced during the campaign in unfortunate and ominous ways. Pashinyan has had a series of vitriolic encounters on the campaign trail with citizens challenging his peace narrative. And a video of masked men threatening violence against him has circulated online. Such threats are not taken lightly in a country that has witnessed repeated political violence, including the assassination of an entire tier of leadership in 1999s parliament shooting.Meanwhile, many in civil society are uncomfortable with what they see as an attempt by the government to enforce amnesia about the loss of Mountainous Karabakh and the mass displacement of its population. Indeed, some claim that government rhetoric spills into hate speech towards former Karabakh Armenians. Pashinyan and his supporters, however, see such claims as masking resistance to the terms of the peace with Azerbaijan.This febrile atmosphere adds to accumulating worries over Armenias democratic trajectory, as polarization shapes an all or nothing attitude to political allegiance. The tone of exchanges between the prime minister and a growing number of constituencies – parts of the opposition, the Armenian Apostolic Church and Karabakh Armenians – is fuelling concerns about the direction of Armenias political culture.For example, in a heated exchange on the campaign trial, Pashinyan asked a Karabakh Armenian refugee why he was still alive, implying he should have stayed and died in Karabakh. The man was later arrested on a charge of hooliganism. Such demarches do not bode well for the stability of any future agreement. Even if Real Armenia is accepted as a geopolitical reality, how it is going to deal with displaced Armenians and the legacy of Karabakh remains an open question – one that must ultimately be decided by Armenians themselves. A pivot to the West, or to the world?Armenias geopolitics unfortunately work against a measured discussion of its democracy.The 2018 Velvet Revolution that swept Pashinyan to power consciously defined itself as a purely domestic affair, leaving Armenias alliance with Russia intact. But the final loss of Karabakh in 2023 released Pashinyan from the need to uphold this alignment. At the same time, it solidified the oppositions belief that rapprochement with Moscow is the only way to prevent further calamity.Much has been made of Armenias pivot to the West. Indeed, many recent outcomes would have been unimaginable a few years ago, when the country was often perceived as a submissive Russian client. The more that Europe sees Armenia as vulnerable to Russian pressure, the easier it will be to overlook shortcomings in Pashinyans democratic record. Notably, the US has become a key peace broker, through the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) – a planned trade, communications and energy transit route running across southern Armenia between Azerbaijan and its exclave Nakhchivan. Yerevan also hosted a European Political Community summit, alongside the first ever EU-Armenia summit, a few days before the election campaign began. Warm rhetoric of Armenias European choice dominated the airwaves. Yet pivots to the West also carry risks for Armenias democracy. The more that Russia perceives Armenia as a liability in a poaching game with the EU, the more it will commit to the rules of that game. That is risky for Armenia, given its significant dependencies on Russia for energy and food supply, and still substantial remittances from Armenian migrant workers in Russia.Conversely, the more that Europe sees Armenia as vulnerable to Russian pressure, the easier it will be to overlook shortcomings in Pashinyans democratic record in hopes of upholding the Western candidate.A choice between Russia and the West is also a reductive way of viewing of Armenias foreign policy options. Multipolarity is inherent to the South Caucasus, and increasingly evident in the foreign policies of its states. All three of the South Caucasus countries are converging on omni-alignment, seeking to become nodes in wider Eurasian connectivity flows.Armenia has been upgrading its relations in multiple directions, including with the Gulf states, South Asia and China. And important ties with Russia remain: Yerevans membership of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is a dead letter and unlikely to be revived. But its membership of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) still affords real benefits. And Russia remains Armenias single largest export market.
Elite capture of Africas critical minerals mustnt be mistaken for resource sovereignty Elite capture of Africas critical minerals mustnt be mistaken for resource sovereignty The World Today mhiggins.drupal 26 May 2026 The exploitation of resource riches by unaccountable leaders is not the same as states stewarding mineral supplies for the benefit of their people, write Christopher Vandome and Tighisti Amare. The article Critical mineral-rich Africa can look after itself published in the spring issue of The World Today addresses the capacity of African countries to make the most of the resources they may have. It correctly noted that leaders of these countries should assert resource sovereignty for the benefit of their societies and economies. However, some of the examples it discusses are problematic.African political leadership and institutional configurations are the most important determinants of whether states benefit from their natural resources. Sovereign resource management on behalf of citizens can drive diversified development. By contrast, the capture of mineral wealth by narrow elites for personal enrichment and to secure external support for political survival perpetuates inequality and insecurity. Social media campaigns in Burkina Faso will have you believe that the nationalization of mining assets is a bold assertion of resource sovereignty. The former is the legitimate exercise of sovereignty through consensual contract renegotiation and the revision of regulatory regimes in ways that increase public benefit and transparency while maintaining trust with good-faith partners. The latter is elite capture, by which a small group seizes the levers of state and then uses control over mineral resources to strike opaque security and financial bargains often with malign actors, consolidating authoritarian governance rather than accountable institutions.Predatory actorsAs such, the articles example of President Ibrahim Traorés mining reforms in Burkina Faso is perhaps not the best illustration of agency. The president came to power through a military coup in 2022 and now governs a country in which the state effectively controls just a fraction of national territory. The withdrawal in January 2025 of Burkina Faso from the regional bloc ECOWAS has weakened regional mechanisms for addressing insecurity and deepened tensions with neighbours. Social media campaigns, linked to the presidents brother, extol the virtues of African agency and will have you believe that the nationalization of mining assets is a bold assertion of resource sovereignty. The detail is more troubling.Mining licences have been issued to a Russian firm operating under international sanctions; Burkina Fasos gold is also widely suspected to be financing Russias war in Ukraine and underwriting presidential security deals with Russian security contractors. These arrangements will almost certainly cut the country off from legitimate international financial markets, leaving it with fewer bargaining options and at the mercy of predatory actors whose interests are often at odds with long-term national development. Some leaders understand mining governance requires patient investors, stable regulation and long-term contracts. Furthermore, the governments cancellation of licences for industrial operators leaves deposits and supply chains vulnerable to illegal extraction and potential exploitation by traders linked to regional terrorism. Unregulated artisanal production, often involving child and slave labour, has increased in Burkina Faso and across the region.The article also refers to the transatlantic slave trade, citing African rulers who played European powers against each other to drive up prices. Even with historical contextualization, few African citizens view the slave trade – an indelible stain on the conscience of humanity – as a moment of negotiating success. This was obviously not a moment of collective agency; rather, it was an earlier form of elite capture, in which narrow interests were advanced at profound human and societal cost.Successful stewardsNone of which is to say that the 21st-century African state cannot be a successful steward of its mineral resources. For instance, Moroccos Office Chérifien des Phosphates (the OCP Group) demonstrates how state ownership, long-term planning and transparent corporate governance can provide both national benefit and global competitiveness in the extractive sector. African states should be able to renegotiate mining contracts or update regulatory frameworks; but this must be done in ways that reduce risk, attract patient capital and align with citizens interests rather than the security of a narrow elite.African leaders have real choices in how they engage with international demand for resources. And a more nuanced argument is how they can design deals that bring together African, Chinese, Gulf and western capital, expertise and political partners to de-risk projects and anchor them in long-term developmental needs.