Skip to content
Live From Europe
euiss

euiss

englishNeutral
www.iss.europa.eu

euiss

Latest articles(119 total)

EU–Central Asia Strategic Institutes Forum in Brussels
european union

EU–Central Asia Strategic Institutes Forum in Brussels

Bojana Zorić on what the Student List's win means for Serbia-EU relations Bojana Zorić on what the Student List's win means for Serbia-EU relations marianna.liana… Thu, 10/29/2026 - 15:25 Although the Student List's priorities align with the democratic reforms required for Serbia's EU accession, "if we talk about foreign policy, it does not have to translate into direct support for the EU," Bojana Zorić emphasised in Diari ARA.  Nevertheless, since the the majority of voters who have backed the grassroots student movement are pro-European, she expects the new government to be "more constructive with European aspirations" and sees its victory as an opportunity to "reset" Serbia-EU relations. "We will see a new beginning in the negotiation process," she concluded. (in Catalan)  Press media Diari ARA
european union

Bojana Zorić on what the Student List's win means for Serbia-EU relations Bojana Zorić on what the Student List's win means for Serbia-EU relations marianna.liana… Thu, 10/29/2026 - 15:25 Although the Student List's priorities align with the democratic reforms required for Serbia's EU accession, "if we talk about foreign policy, it does not have to translate into direct support for the EU," Bojana Zorić emphasised in Diari ARA.  Nevertheless, since the the majority of voters who have backed the grassroots student movement are pro-European, she expects the new government to be "more constructive with European aspirations" and sees its victory as an opportunity to "reset" Serbia-EU relations. "We will see a new beginning in the negotiation process," she concluded. (in Catalan)  Press media Diari ARA

Bojana Zorić on the Student List's election win Bojana Zorić on the Student List's election win marianna.liana… Thu, 10/29/2026 - 14:26 Commenting on Serbia's newly elected Student List, Bojana Zorić told Channel 4 that "it's one thing to bring people together around a demand for change, but it is another to govern, make difficult decisions and deliver reforms". She cautioned that the challenge for this diverse movement will be to agree on a government and reform institutions quickly enough to meet voters' expectations. Her full interview features in an episode of Channel 4's 'The Breakdown', covering the roots and evolution of Serbia's leaderless student movement and how it came to beat Aleksandar Vučić. The episode looks at how the Novi Sad tragedy spawned the movement that brought down the government, how this democratic experiment of sorts achieved such success, and why other countries and Gen Z movements will now be watching developments in Serbia very closely. Press media Channel 4
serbia

Bojana Zorić on the Student List's election win Bojana Zorić on the Student List's election win marianna.liana… Thu, 10/29/2026 - 14:26 Commenting on Serbia's newly elected Student List, Bojana Zorić told Channel 4 that "it's one thing to bring people together around a demand for change, but it is another to govern, make difficult decisions and deliver reforms". She cautioned that the challenge for this diverse movement will be to agree on a government and reform institutions quickly enough to meet voters' expectations. Her full interview features in an episode of Channel 4's 'The Breakdown', covering the roots and evolution of Serbia's leaderless student movement and how it came to beat Aleksandar Vučić. The episode looks at how the Novi Sad tragedy spawned the movement that brought down the government, how this democratic experiment of sorts achieved such success, and why other countries and Gen Z movements will now be watching developments in Serbia very closely. Press media Channel 4

Financing Europe's defence build-up: National budgets and beyond Financing Europe's defence build-up: National budgets and beyond christian.diet… Thu, 10/29/2026 - 10:45 18 minutes Defence budgets across Europe are rising. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, combined with doubts over the future of US security guarantees, has prompted European governments to invest more in defence. According to EUISS calculations based on EDA and NATO data, spending by EU Member States was 56% higher in 2025 than it was in 2022, after accounting for inflation. One challenge is sustaining and increasing this spending. Rebuilding Europe's military capacity will require investment over many years. Yet many national budgets are under pressure from fiscal constraints, higher borrowing costs and competing domestic priorities. Europeans also need to spend more cooperatively to reduce costs and secure economies of scale. The feasibility of cooperation is influenced by many factors, including national threat perceptions, operational cultures, defence planning cycles and national industrial interests, but well-designed financial incentives can make cooperation more attractive. A second challenge is mobilising the investment needed for Europe's broader defence ramp-up, including expanding defence production capacity, investing in R&D and making European infrastructure more resilient to possible sabotage or attack. Europe's defence financing instruments can all play a role in meeting these challenges. This landscape has grown increasingly complex. National budgets remain the main pillar of defence expenditure, but they now form part of a wider ecosystem of EU instruments, public financial institutions like the European Investment Bank (EIB) and private capital, whose role continues to expand. This analysis maps the landscape of European defence financing and assesses the growing number of proposals to strengthen and expand this ecosystem, such as a potential new round of funding under the EU's Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument or multilateral borrowing mechanisms outside the EU framework. Ultimately, there is no silver bullet for Europe's defence financing challenge. There is no alternative to sustained national spending, but it can and should be supplemented by additional sources of funding. While this will not remove the need for difficult fiscal choices, it will make higher defence spending easier and help drive Europe's broader defence ramp-up. The core: National spending   EU Member States have significantly increased defence expenditure since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. In nominal terms, spending rose by approximately €89 billion between 2014 and 2022, reaching €239.75 billion. Since then, spending has risen to €417.62 billion in 2025, an increase of 74%.   After adjusting for inflation, this accounts for an increase of 56% between 2022 and 2025. The current average level of spending represents 2.2% of the EU's €18.8 trillion GDP.   According to the European Defence Agency (EDA), spending will hit €454 billion in 2026, equivalent to 2.4% of EU GDP.   Spending is set to rise even further in subsequent years, with Member States that are also NATO allies pledging to allocate 3.5% of GDP to core defence expenditure by 2035, with an additional 1.5% earmarked for broader defence- and security-related expenditure.   Raising 'core' defence spending to 3.5% of GDP would mean increasing annual spending to around €658 billion. That means Europeans will need to find an additional €204 billion a year (in today's money) by 2035. This will put public finances across most of Europe under strain.   Beyond national budgets: Four priorities to sustain Europe's defence surge As defence expenditure has grown, so has the range of funding streams complementing national budgets. EU instruments, funding from public banks and private finance can all contribute to giving momentum and coherence to Europe's defence ramp-up. The following sections set out four priorities for sustaining Europe's defence surge: Fully exploiting the EU's potential; Leveraging public financial institutions; Exploring joint borrowing beyond the EU; Mobilising private capital. 1. Fully exploiting the EU's potential The EU is the most important source of defence financing beyond national budgets, and it already has a range of instruments to support defence. These are mapped below. In essence, the EU can add value in three ways: by mobilising additional resources, by embedding defence priorities across the wider EU budget, and by using financial incentives to make cooperation more appealing for defence companies and Member States. The EU is already contributing significant resources to European defence expenditure, both in terms of strengthening Europe's defences and supporting Ukraine. Coverage and funding · data table Instrument totals and coverage (● covered; — coverage not listed) Instrument Funding (€ billion) Period R&D industrial production procurement infrastructure and logistics external assistance SAFE 150 2025-2030 — — ● ● — Ukraine Support loan 90 2026-2027 — — — — ● EDF 7.3 2021-27 ● — — — — ASAP 0.5 2023-25 — ● — — — EDIRPA 0.31 2023-25 — — ● — — AGILE 0.115 2027 ● — — — — EDIP 1.5 2026-27 ● ● ● — ● EPF 17 2021-27 — — — — ● Circle area represents funding on a common €150 billion scale. Dots in category columns indicate coverage, not allocated funding. JavaScript is disabled. All data remain available in this table.  SAFE  loans provide €150 billion in low-interest long-term loans to Member States. They allow Member States facing higher borrowing costs than the EU itself to invest more in defence at a lower cost than through national borrowing. The €90 billion  Ukraine Support loan , covering 2026 and 2027, is a major component of European defence spending. Around two-thirds of the loan, which is financed via EU borrowing, is intended to support Ukraine's defence, mainly through purchases of military equipment. The European Defence Fund ( EDF ) has a budget of €7.3 billion for 2021-2027 to finance cooperative R&D. In 2025, the EDF was worth an additional 6% on top of national defence R&D budgets. The Act in Support of Ammunition Production ( ASAP ) was a short-term €500 million programme to ramp up ammunition production capacity in Europe between 2023 and 2025. By leveraging limited EU resources, it provided targeted financial support to 31 projects across 15 Member States. It resulted in an investment of €1.5 billion in the supply chain and contributed to the sixfold increase in production of 155mm shells since 2022. The European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act ( EDIRPA ) provided €310 million to foster joint procurement between 2023 and 2025. It funded five cross-border procurement projects covering air and missile defence systems, ammunition, and armoured vehicles. The Programme for Agile and Rapid Defence Innovation ( AGILE ) has a budget of €115 million for 2027. It will finance the development and testing of disruptive defence technology by providing faster and more flexible funding to individual companies. The European Defence Industry Programme ( EDIP ) has a budget of €1.5 billion for 2025-2027. It builds on the funding approaches of ASAP and EDIRPA, while also providing dedicated funding to support Ukraine, promote its integration into Europe's defence industrial base and finance projects of common European interest. The European Peace Facility ( EPF ) is an off-budget EU instrument worth €17 billion for the period 2021-2027. It aims to support EU military operations and/or assistance to partner countries, including through the provision of lethal equipment and training. Beyond these defence-specific instruments, other EU instruments also indirectly contribute to providing additional resources. Coverage and funding · data table Instrument totals and coverage (● covered; — coverage not listed) Instrument Funding (€ billion) Period R&D industrial production procurement infrastructure and logistics external assistance CEF 1.7 2021-27 — — — ● — EIC 0.734 2026 ● — — — — Cohesion Funds 11.9 2021-27 ● ● — ● — Circle area represents funding on a common €150 billion scale. Dots in category columns indicate coverage, not allocated funding. JavaScript is disabled. All data remain available in this table. The Connecting Europe Facility ( CEF ) with a budget of €1.7 billion in EU grants (2021-2027) has been used to strengthen dual-use transport infrastructure and facilitate cross-border military mobility, supporting 95 dual-use transport infrastructure projects across 21 Member States. The European Innovation Council ( EIC ) is also involved in supporting defence. The EIC Accelerator, with a budget of €634 million in 2026, supports start-ups, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and small mid-caps in developing disruptive technologies, including dual-use technologies. Meanwhile, in June 2026 the EIC's Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP) Scale Up Scheme announced €100 million in funding for defence technologies including air and missile defence, artillery, and drones and counter-drone systems(1). Finally,  cohesion funds  can be used to support defence. In March 2026, the Commission reported that Member States had agreed to reprogramme €11.9 billion in 2021-2027 cohesion funds towards defence and dual-use investments. Aside from providing additional resources for defence, EU instruments can also make cooperation more attractive, helping make European defence spending more efficient. For example, the EDF has contributed to the creation of partnerships between European defence companies that would probably not otherwise have worked together. On the demand side, EDIRPA, EDIP and SAFE have the same purpose. Coverage and funding · data table Instrument totals and coverage (● covered; — coverage not listed) Instrument Funding (€ billion) Period R&D industrial production procurement infrastructure and logistics external assistance SAFE 150 2025-2030 — — ● ● — EDIRPA 0.31 2023-25 — — ● — — EDIP 1.5 2026-27 ● ● ● — ● Circle area represents funding on a common €150 billion scale. Dots in category columns indicate coverage, not allocated funding. JavaScript is disabled. All data remain available in this table.  EDIRPA  demonstrated the potential of targeted EU incentives to encourage cooperation: the original budget leveraged €11 billion in joint procurement orders, with each project involving an average of six Member States. While this volume reflected pre-existing national requirements, EDIRPA helped governments aggregate their national requirements into joint orders.  SAFE  is also meant to encourage joint procurement, although the degree to which it will do so remains to be seen, as it allows carve-outs for some national projects and cooperation will also depend on whether Member States' capability needs and procurement timelines align. Meanwhile,  EDIP  aims to build on EDIRPA's approach, allocating €240 million to foster collaborative procurement by at least three Member States across capability areas, such as counter-drone systems, ammunition, missiles and air and missile defence; and €325 million for Defence Projects of Common Interest, such as counter-drone technology, protection of critical undersea infrastructure and air and missile defence. There is a strong case for expanding EU defence funding, and using it more strategically by targeting funding at key capability priorities and at joint projects. First, the EU can provide cheap financing to Member States with limited fiscal space. This is valuable in itself as it takes some pressure off national budgets and will allow Member States to increase and sustain defence spending. Additional EU financing could take the form of loans or grants. An extension of the Ukraine loan beyond 2027 in some form is likely to be necessary. In terms of funding Europe's own defence, loan-based instruments may be more politically feasible, as responsibility for repayment rests with individual governments. A new round of funding under SAFE would be a powerful way to mobilise additional resources for Europe's defence build-up. The 2028–2034 EU budget could also be a sizeable source of defence funding. The Commission has proposed allocating €131 billion to defence, security and space, although this figure could be reduced. Much will also depend on how much of this envelope would go to defence specifically, and what funding logic it would follow. Looking beyond the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), the idea of EU defence bonds remains a harder sell. Repayments fall on all Member States, and for many it is cheaper to raise and spend money nationally. Nevertheless, these concerns could potentially be overcome through mechanisms to tightly target spending at agreed priorities with clear added value for all Member States. Second, EU funding can increase the efficiency of European defence spending by driving cooperation, reducing fragmentation and enabling projects that may otherwise not have been possible. Linking a new round of SAFE funding more closely to joint rather than national procurement would further strengthen incentives for cooperation. Beyond tightening eligibility criteria, additional inducements could include financing fewer projects at higher rates, and focusing funding on emerging areas where there are fewer established national industrial players. The key will be striking a balance between the eligibility criteria and the funding on offer. The structure of cooperation also matters. Forcing large groups of countries to cooperate is likely to backfire, as modest financing cannot substitute for political alignment, shared threat perceptions and common capability priorities. Financing aimed at fostering the emergence of groupings with a shared vision is more likely to lead to concrete joint projects. Third, looking beyond the EU's defence instruments to the Union's broader toolkit and budget, the priority should be embedding defence considerations horizontally across EU instruments as much as possible. For example, any defence-related elements of a proposal should be taken into account as fully as possible when evaluating projects in areas such as innovation, regional policy, energy, digital connectivity or transport. 2. Leveraging the role of public financial institutions Harnessing the role of public financial institutions should be a second priority. In recent years these institutions have played a growing role in funding defence, above all the European Investment Bank, but also other national promotional banks. Coverage and funding · data table Instrument totals and coverage (● covered; — coverage not listed) Instrument Funding (€ billion) Period R&D industrial production procurement infrastructure and logistics external assistance EIB 4.5 2025 ● ● — ● — Circle area represents funding on a common €150 billion scale. Dots in category columns indicate coverage, not allocated funding. JavaScript is disabled. All data remain available in this table. Historically, the EIB's lending policy was limited to a 'dual-use' framework. This began to change in 2022, when the EIB launched its Strategic European Security Initiative, and accelerated significantly from 2024, when the Bank broadened its eligibility criteria for security and defence investments. The EIB's annual defence lending has rapidly grown, from €1.2 billion in 2024 to over €4 billion in 2025. The EIB is involved in defence investment in four ways. First, the EIB supports defence R&D, providing loans to defence companies(2). Second, the EIB finances defence-related and dual-use infrastructure, including projects such as a military base in Lithuania(3). Third, it strengthens the defence industrial base by supporting supply-chain finance and providing capital for companies operating in the security and defence ecosystem(4). Fourth, the EIB invests in venture-capital and private-equity funds supporting defence start-ups and SMEs through its €175 million Defence Equity Facility, which it aims to expand to €1 billion. However, the EIB is not designed to finance weapons or ammunition. Its shareholders also remain sensitive to maintaining the Bank's AAA rating. While the EIB can help lower financing costs, it cannot replace national defence budgets or procure military equipment directly. Coverage and funding · data table Instrument totals and coverage (● covered; — coverage not listed) Instrument Funding (€ billion) Period R&D industrial production procurement infrastructure and logistics external assistance National development banks Not quantified Period not specified ● ● ● ● — Circle area represents funding on a common €150 billion scale. Dots in category columns indicate coverage, not allocated funding. JavaScript is disabled. All data remain available in this table.  National development banks  could become a key source of support for Europe's defence build-up. A key focus is R&D. For example, of the top 10 active investors in defence, security, and resilience in Europe in 2025 at (pre-)seed level, 6 were public entities. Beyond R&D, national development banks have also supported industrial production and military procurement. For example, Germany's KfW has partnered with the EIB and other banks to support drone manufacturer Quantum Systems in scaling production(5). Poland's BGK, which operates the Armed Forces Support Fund, has raised capital to support the purchase of Korean K2 tanks(6). Public banks also support dual-use infrastructure projects. For instance, in June 2025, the EIB agreed with France's Caisse des Dépôts, Germany's KfW, Italy's CDP, Poland's BGK and Spain's ICO to explore potential joint financing for security and defence, including in infrastructure(7). Fully harnessing the EIB's potential should be a priority. There are obstacles to greater involvement of the Bank in purely defence-related projects, notably the higher level of risk associated with certain defence investments, which could jeopardise its AAA rating. Nevertheless, there is a strong case for the Bank to further expand defence lending. For example, the EIB could help de-risk investments in joint production by Ukrainian and European companies in the EU. More broadly, the EIB could take on a larger role in financing upgrades to critical infrastructure, including to support military mobility. 3. Exploring joint borrowing beyond the EU There is growing discussion of borrowing mechanisms beyond the EU framework. One reason is that reaching agreement among a small group of countries could be easier than reaching agreement among all 27 Member States, and it could be easier to include non-EU partners such as the UK or Norway. Some options are already being explored. In March 2026, Finland, the Netherlands and the UK announced that they were exploring a new defence financing and procurement mechanism aimed at driving joint procurement(8). Coverage and funding · data table Instrument totals and coverage (● covered; — coverage not listed) Instrument Funding (€ billion) Period R&D industrial production procurement infrastructure and logistics external assistance MDM Not quantified Period not specified ● ● ● — — DSRB Not quantified Period not specified ● ● ● ● ● Circle area represents funding on a common €150 billion scale. Dots in category columns indicate coverage, not allocated funding. JavaScript is disabled. All data remain available in this table. By July 2026, Poland had joined the initiative, now known as the  Multilateral Defence Mechanism (MDM) . However, borrowing outside of the EU would mean that using the Union's tested borrowing infrastructure would not be possible, which would complicate debt issuance. Countries that can borrow more cheaply nationally may still question the value of such collective borrowing. Another idea is the proposal to set up a  Defence, Security and Resilience Bank (DSRB) , with defence financing as a core part of its mandate. The DSRB could mobilise capital that may not otherwise be available, support projects outside the EIB's comfort zone, and help bring together financing for defence-relevant infrastructure. However, governments would have to provide the initial capital, potentially adding to their overall debt levels. Moreover, the added value of a new bank may not be evident given the role already played by existing financial institutions such as the EIB in supporting defence investment. Still, the DSRB should be taken seriously. Indeed, the idea is gaining ground: in July 2026, Canada, Albania, Belgium, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, Romania, Türkiye and Ukraine announced their shared intention to establish the DSRB, with the aim of allowing it to begin operations as early as 2027. The MDM and the DSRB pursue the same broad objective as EU instruments: mobilising additional resources for European defence and making cooperative projects easier to finance. EU institutions could be associated with both mechanisms, helping to coordinate projects. The EU could also be a co-investor when this aligns with its own priorities. For example, EU grants could provide targeted top-ups, and Member States participating in MDM projects could combine these with SAFE-style loans, if projects meet EU eligibility criteria. 4. Mobilising private capital The private sector is playing a growing role in supporting Europe's defence ramp-up. Venture capital is a particularly important source of financing for emerging defence players. European defence start-ups are set to raise over €9 billion in 2026, four times as much as in 2025. Data also suggests that the EU is attracting a larger share of defence venture capital funding, with the EU share across NATO, Canada, Australia and New Zealand rising from 13% in 2024 to 21% in 2026.   Coverage and funding · data table Instrument totals and coverage (● covered; — coverage not listed) Instrument Funding (€ billion) Period R&D industrial production procurement infrastructure and logistics external assistance Private funding Not quantified Period not specified ● ● — — — NATO Innovation Fund Not quantified 2023-2038 ● — — — — NATO DIANA Not quantified 2025 ● — — — — Circle area represents funding on a common €150 billion scale. Dots in category columns indicate coverage, not allocated funding. JavaScript is disabled. All data remain available in this table. Aside from venture capital, the  traditional banking sector  also contributes to expanding Europe's defence production capacity. A number of European banks, such as ING, Deutsche Bank and Danske Bank, have expanded their defence financing activities by extending lending or setting up dedicated offices. Demand for defence-focused exchange-traded funds has also increased sharply. Flows into defence ETFs support valuations of listed companies, allowing them to raise capital more easily. However, they do not benefit unlisted companies. NATO instruments are also helping to mobilise private investment. The  NATO Innovation Fund  is a standalone venture capital fund, backed by 24 countries in NATO. It has around €1 billion in committed capital, which it aims to invest over 15 years. The fund operates independently of NATO and its founding countries. It invests in science and engineering start-ups developing emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) in fields such as energy, materials science, AI, quantum computing, biotechnology and space. In parallel, NATO's Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic ( DIANA ) provides defence start-ups with limited funding (€11 million in 2025), as well as highly valuable access to test centres and military users. The key challenge is mobilising  private capital  beyond funds with a high-risk appetite, looking for example to institutional investors such as pension funds, as well as private savers. Completing the EU Savings and Investments Union would be an important step, as it would allow private savings across Europe to be more easily and smoothly mobilised for defence investment. Another priority is to ensure that the Commission's December 2025 clarification of the EU sustainable-finance framework is consistently reflected in national practices, so that regulatory obstacles do not prevent large institutional investors, such as pension funds, from investing in defence. There are limits to what private capital can do. Private capital can provide additional resources and momentum for Europe's defence ramp-up. It can help promising defence investments get off the ground by allowing innovative companies that struggle to access financing to secure the funding needed to develop prototypes and pay contractors along their supply chains. Private capital may also have a role in defence-relevant infrastructure, especially where projects generate long-term revenues. However, these companies will still struggle to sustain and expand their operations unless they secure contracts from governments. Ultimately, the most useful thing that governments can do to better harness private capital is to focus on creating demand by providing clear, long-term signals about future defence needs. Conclusions Europeans face a major fiscal challenge in sustaining and increasing their defence spending. In reality, the challenge is twofold: on one hand governments need to maintain and expand defence spending; on the other Europe needs to mobilise the investment to strengthen its defence and secure its critical infrastructure. When it comes to the first challenge, national budgets remain the core. However, they can be complemented by other sources of finance. Additional EU-level grants can provide genuinely new resources for defence. There is a strategic choice to be made in terms of how much grant funding from the next EU budget goes to defence, and how much priority defence is given relative to other objectives. At the same time, new SAFE-style loans can allow Member States to spend more by leveraging the EU's collective credit rating to borrow more cheaply. Lending from the EIB and national promotional banks can finance specific projects and take some pressure off government budgets. Meanwhile, novel mechanisms such as the Multilateral Defence Mechanism and the Defence, Security and Resilience Bank could allow for cheaper government borrowing by harnessing the credibility of a broad group of governments and facilitating joint procurement. However, all loans taken out by governments will still add to government debt levels. Meeting the industrial and resilience challenge is different. If governments provide credible long-term demand, this can crowd in investment by public and private banks and private investors, allowing defence companies to invest in R&D, industrial expansion and so on. The surge in VC funding for defence shows that investors respond when they see a promising market. In the same way, government policy and public funding can attract private investment to help make Europe's infrastructure more resilient and therefore fit to deter adversaries. All this is helpful to Europe's broader defence ramp-up, and takes some of the burden of defence investment off governments. However, private finance does not in itself help governments maintain larger budgets or avoid difficult choices. Ultimately, Europe's defence surge will be sustained by national budgets. But Europeans should not shy away from drawing on the full range of defence financing tools at their disposal to reinforce national spending and amplify its impact. 1. European Innovation Council, 'EIC 2026 Work Programme', amended 17 June 2026 ( 2. See for example: European Investment Bank, 'Indra Group to step up research and development of defence and space technologies with €385 million in EIB financing', 15 July 2025 ( 3. European Investment Bank, 'EIB backs new military base in Lithuania with €540 million loan', 20 June 2025 ( 4. European Investment Bank, 'EIB triples financing for banks to provide liquidity to SMEs in the supply chain of Europe's defence industry, signs first deal with Deutsche Bank', 11 June 2025 ( 5. European Investment Bank, 'Quantum Systems secures new European financing package to scale the future of unmanned technologies', 12 February 2026 ( 6. Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK), 'BGK secures international financing for modernisation of Polish Army', 29 December 2025 ( 7. European Investment Bank, 'European promotional institutions and EIB join forces to support EU security and defence', 6 June 2025 ( 8. HM Treasury, 'Joint statement from Finland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom on joint defence financing and procurement', 17 March 2026 ( Disable Centered Alignment Off Image Image Not visible in views Off
european union

Financing Europe's defence build-up: National budgets and beyond Financing Europe's defence build-up: National budgets and beyond christian.diet… Thu, 10/29/2026 - 10:45 18 minutes Defence budgets across Europe are rising. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, combined with doubts over the future of US security guarantees, has prompted European governments to invest more in defence. According to EUISS calculations based on EDA and NATO data, spending by EU Member States was 56% higher in 2025 than it was in 2022, after accounting for inflation. One challenge is sustaining and increasing this spending. Rebuilding Europe's military capacity will require investment over many years. Yet many national budgets are under pressure from fiscal constraints, higher borrowing costs and competing domestic priorities. Europeans also need to spend more cooperatively to reduce costs and secure economies of scale. The feasibility of cooperation is influenced by many factors, including national threat perceptions, operational cultures, defence planning cycles and national industrial interests, but well-designed financial incentives can make cooperation more attractive. A second challenge is mobilising the investment needed for Europe's broader defence ramp-up, including expanding defence production capacity, investing in R&D and making European infrastructure more resilient to possible sabotage or attack. Europe's defence financing instruments can all play a role in meeting these challenges. This landscape has grown increasingly complex. National budgets remain the main pillar of defence expenditure, but they now form part of a wider ecosystem of EU instruments, public financial institutions like the European Investment Bank (EIB) and private capital, whose role continues to expand. This analysis maps the landscape of European defence financing and assesses the growing number of proposals to strengthen and expand this ecosystem, such as a potential new round of funding under the EU's Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument or multilateral borrowing mechanisms outside the EU framework. Ultimately, there is no silver bullet for Europe's defence financing challenge. There is no alternative to sustained national spending, but it can and should be supplemented by additional sources of funding. While this will not remove the need for difficult fiscal choices, it will make higher defence spending easier and help drive Europe's broader defence ramp-up. The core: National spending   EU Member States have significantly increased defence expenditure since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. In nominal terms, spending rose by approximately €89 billion between 2014 and 2022, reaching €239.75 billion. Since then, spending has risen to €417.62 billion in 2025, an increase of 74%.   After adjusting for inflation, this accounts for an increase of 56% between 2022 and 2025. The current average level of spending represents 2.2% of the EU's €18.8 trillion GDP.   According to the European Defence Agency (EDA), spending will hit €454 billion in 2026, equivalent to 2.4% of EU GDP.   Spending is set to rise even further in subsequent years, with Member States that are also NATO allies pledging to allocate 3.5% of GDP to core defence expenditure by 2035, with an additional 1.5% earmarked for broader defence- and security-related expenditure.   Raising 'core' defence spending to 3.5% of GDP would mean increasing annual spending to around €658 billion. That means Europeans will need to find an additional €204 billion a year (in today's money) by 2035. This will put public finances across most of Europe under strain.   Beyond national budgets: Four priorities to sustain Europe's defence surge As defence expenditure has grown, so has the range of funding streams complementing national budgets. EU instruments, funding from public banks and private finance can all contribute to giving momentum and coherence to Europe's defence ramp-up. The following sections set out four priorities for sustaining Europe's defence surge: Fully exploiting the EU's potential; Leveraging public financial institutions; Exploring joint borrowing beyond the EU; Mobilising private capital. 1. Fully exploiting the EU's potential The EU is the most important source of defence financing beyond national budgets, and it already has a range of instruments to support defence. These are mapped below. In essence, the EU can add value in three ways: by mobilising additional resources, by embedding defence priorities across the wider EU budget, and by using financial incentives to make cooperation more appealing for defence companies and Member States. The EU is already contributing significant resources to European defence expenditure, both in terms of strengthening Europe's defences and supporting Ukraine. Coverage and funding · data table Instrument totals and coverage (● covered; — coverage not listed) Instrument Funding (€ billion) Period R&D industrial production procurement infrastructure and logistics external assistance SAFE 150 2025-2030 — — ● ● — Ukraine Support loan 90 2026-2027 — — — — ● EDF 7.3 2021-27 ● — — — — ASAP 0.5 2023-25 — ● — — — EDIRPA 0.31 2023-25 — — ● — — AGILE 0.115 2027 ● — — — — EDIP 1.5 2026-27 ● ● ● — ● EPF 17 2021-27 — — — — ● Circle area represents funding on a common €150 billion scale. Dots in category columns indicate coverage, not allocated funding. JavaScript is disabled. All data remain available in this table.  SAFE  loans provide €150 billion in low-interest long-term loans to Member States. They allow Member States facing higher borrowing costs than the EU itself to invest more in defence at a lower cost than through national borrowing. The €90 billion  Ukraine Support loan , covering 2026 and 2027, is a major component of European defence spending. Around two-thirds of the loan, which is financed via EU borrowing, is intended to support Ukraine's defence, mainly through purchases of military equipment. The European Defence Fund ( EDF ) has a budget of €7.3 billion for 2021-2027 to finance cooperative R&D. In 2025, the EDF was worth an additional 6% on top of national defence R&D budgets. The Act in Support of Ammunition Production ( ASAP ) was a short-term €500 million programme to ramp up ammunition production capacity in Europe between 2023 and 2025. By leveraging limited EU resources, it provided targeted financial support to 31 projects across 15 Member States. It resulted in an investment of €1.5 billion in the supply chain and contributed to the sixfold increase in production of 155mm shells since 2022. The European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act ( EDIRPA ) provided €310 million to foster joint procurement between 2023 and 2025. It funded five cross-border procurement projects covering air and missile defence systems, ammunition, and armoured vehicles. The Programme for Agile and Rapid Defence Innovation ( AGILE ) has a budget of €115 million for 2027. It will finance the development and testing of disruptive defence technology by providing faster and more flexible funding to individual companies. The European Defence Industry Programme ( EDIP ) has a budget of €1.5 billion for 2025-2027. It builds on the funding approaches of ASAP and EDIRPA, while also providing dedicated funding to support Ukraine, promote its integration into Europe's defence industrial base and finance projects of common European interest. The European Peace Facility ( EPF ) is an off-budget EU instrument worth €17 billion for the period 2021-2027. It aims to support EU military operations and/or assistance to partner countries, including through the provision of lethal equipment and training. Beyond these defence-specific instruments, other EU instruments also indirectly contribute to providing additional resources. Coverage and funding · data table Instrument totals and coverage (● covered; — coverage not listed) Instrument Funding (€ billion) Period R&D industrial production procurement infrastructure and logistics external assistance CEF 1.7 2021-27 — — — ● — EIC 0.734 2026 ● — — — — Cohesion Funds 11.9 2021-27 ● ● — ● — Circle area represents funding on a common €150 billion scale. Dots in category columns indicate coverage, not allocated funding. JavaScript is disabled. All data remain available in this table. The Connecting Europe Facility ( CEF ) with a budget of €1.7 billion in EU grants (2021-2027) has been used to strengthen dual-use transport infrastructure and facilitate cross-border military mobility, supporting 95 dual-use transport infrastructure projects across 21 Member States. The European Innovation Council ( EIC ) is also involved in supporting defence. The EIC Accelerator, with a budget of €634 million in 2026, supports start-ups, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and small mid-caps in developing disruptive technologies, including dual-use technologies. Meanwhile, in June 2026 the EIC's Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP) Scale Up Scheme announced €100 million in funding for defence technologies including air and missile defence, artillery, and drones and counter-drone systems(1). Finally,  cohesion funds  can be used to support defence. In March 2026, the Commission reported that Member States had agreed to reprogramme €11.9 billion in 2021-2027 cohesion funds towards defence and dual-use investments. Aside from providing additional resources for defence, EU instruments can also make cooperation more attractive, helping make European defence spending more efficient. For example, the EDF has contributed to the creation of partnerships between European defence companies that would probably not otherwise have worked together. On the demand side, EDIRPA, EDIP and SAFE have the same purpose. Coverage and funding · data table Instrument totals and coverage (● covered; — coverage not listed) Instrument Funding (€ billion) Period R&D industrial production procurement infrastructure and logistics external assistance SAFE 150 2025-2030 — — ● ● — EDIRPA 0.31 2023-25 — — ● — — EDIP 1.5 2026-27 ● ● ● — ● Circle area represents funding on a common €150 billion scale. Dots in category columns indicate coverage, not allocated funding. JavaScript is disabled. All data remain available in this table.  EDIRPA  demonstrated the potential of targeted EU incentives to encourage cooperation: the original budget leveraged €11 billion in joint procurement orders, with each project involving an average of six Member States. While this volume reflected pre-existing national requirements, EDIRPA helped governments aggregate their national requirements into joint orders.  SAFE  is also meant to encourage joint procurement, although the degree to which it will do so remains to be seen, as it allows carve-outs for some national projects and cooperation will also depend on whether Member States' capability needs and procurement timelines align. Meanwhile,  EDIP  aims to build on EDIRPA's approach, allocating €240 million to foster collaborative procurement by at least three Member States across capability areas, such as counter-drone systems, ammunition, missiles and air and missile defence; and €325 million for Defence Projects of Common Interest, such as counter-drone technology, protection of critical undersea infrastructure and air and missile defence. There is a strong case for expanding EU defence funding, and using it more strategically by targeting funding at key capability priorities and at joint projects. First, the EU can provide cheap financing to Member States with limited fiscal space. This is valuable in itself as it takes some pressure off national budgets and will allow Member States to increase and sustain defence spending. Additional EU financing could take the form of loans or grants. An extension of the Ukraine loan beyond 2027 in some form is likely to be necessary. In terms of funding Europe's own defence, loan-based instruments may be more politically feasible, as responsibility for repayment rests with individual governments. A new round of funding under SAFE would be a powerful way to mobilise additional resources for Europe's defence build-up. The 2028–2034 EU budget could also be a sizeable source of defence funding. The Commission has proposed allocating €131 billion to defence, security and space, although this figure could be reduced. Much will also depend on how much of this envelope would go to defence specifically, and what funding logic it would follow. Looking beyond the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), the idea of EU defence bonds remains a harder sell. Repayments fall on all Member States, and for many it is cheaper to raise and spend money nationally. Nevertheless, these concerns could potentially be overcome through mechanisms to tightly target spending at agreed priorities with clear added value for all Member States. Second, EU funding can increase the efficiency of European defence spending by driving cooperation, reducing fragmentation and enabling projects that may otherwise not have been possible. Linking a new round of SAFE funding more closely to joint rather than national procurement would further strengthen incentives for cooperation. Beyond tightening eligibility criteria, additional inducements could include financing fewer projects at higher rates, and focusing funding on emerging areas where there are fewer established national industrial players. The key will be striking a balance between the eligibility criteria and the funding on offer. The structure of cooperation also matters. Forcing large groups of countries to cooperate is likely to backfire, as modest financing cannot substitute for political alignment, shared threat perceptions and common capability priorities. Financing aimed at fostering the emergence of groupings with a shared vision is more likely to lead to concrete joint projects. Third, looking beyond the EU's defence instruments to the Union's broader toolkit and budget, the priority should be embedding defence considerations horizontally across EU instruments as much as possible. For example, any defence-related elements of a proposal should be taken into account as fully as possible when evaluating projects in areas such as innovation, regional policy, energy, digital connectivity or transport. 2. Leveraging the role of public financial institutions Harnessing the role of public financial institutions should be a second priority. In recent years these institutions have played a growing role in funding defence, above all the European Investment Bank, but also other national promotional banks. Coverage and funding · data table Instrument totals and coverage (● covered; — coverage not listed) Instrument Funding (€ billion) Period R&D industrial production procurement infrastructure and logistics external assistance EIB 4.5 2025 ● ● — ● — Circle area represents funding on a common €150 billion scale. Dots in category columns indicate coverage, not allocated funding. JavaScript is disabled. All data remain available in this table. Historically, the EIB's lending policy was limited to a 'dual-use' framework. This began to change in 2022, when the EIB launched its Strategic European Security Initiative, and accelerated significantly from 2024, when the Bank broadened its eligibility criteria for security and defence investments. The EIB's annual defence lending has rapidly grown, from €1.2 billion in 2024 to over €4 billion in 2025. The EIB is involved in defence investment in four ways. First, the EIB supports defence R&D, providing loans to defence companies(2). Second, the EIB finances defence-related and dual-use infrastructure, including projects such as a military base in Lithuania(3). Third, it strengthens the defence industrial base by supporting supply-chain finance and providing capital for companies operating in the security and defence ecosystem(4). Fourth, the EIB invests in venture-capital and private-equity funds supporting defence start-ups and SMEs through its €175 million Defence Equity Facility, which it aims to expand to €1 billion. However, the EIB is not designed to finance weapons or ammunition. Its shareholders also remain sensitive to maintaining the Bank's AAA rating. While the EIB can help lower financing costs, it cannot replace national defence budgets or procure military equipment directly. Coverage and funding · data table Instrument totals and coverage (● covered; — coverage not listed) Instrument Funding (€ billion) Period R&D industrial production procurement infrastructure and logistics external assistance National development banks Not quantified Period not specified ● ● ● ● — Circle area represents funding on a common €150 billion scale. Dots in category columns indicate coverage, not allocated funding. JavaScript is disabled. All data remain available in this table.  National development banks  could become a key source of support for Europe's defence build-up. A key focus is R&D. For example, of the top 10 active investors in defence, security, and resilience in Europe in 2025 at (pre-)seed level, 6 were public entities. Beyond R&D, national development banks have also supported industrial production and military procurement. For example, Germany's KfW has partnered with the EIB and other banks to support drone manufacturer Quantum Systems in scaling production(5). Poland's BGK, which operates the Armed Forces Support Fund, has raised capital to support the purchase of Korean K2 tanks(6). Public banks also support dual-use infrastructure projects. For instance, in June 2025, the EIB agreed with France's Caisse des Dépôts, Germany's KfW, Italy's CDP, Poland's BGK and Spain's ICO to explore potential joint financing for security and defence, including in infrastructure(7). Fully harnessing the EIB's potential should be a priority. There are obstacles to greater involvement of the Bank in purely defence-related projects, notably the higher level of risk associated with certain defence investments, which could jeopardise its AAA rating. Nevertheless, there is a strong case for the Bank to further expand defence lending. For example, the EIB could help de-risk investments in joint production by Ukrainian and European companies in the EU. More broadly, the EIB could take on a larger role in financing upgrades to critical infrastructure, including to support military mobility. 3. Exploring joint borrowing beyond the EU There is growing discussion of borrowing mechanisms beyond the EU framework. One reason is that reaching agreement among a small group of countries could be easier than reaching agreement among all 27 Member States, and it could be easier to include non-EU partners such as the UK or Norway. Some options are already being explored. In March 2026, Finland, the Netherlands and the UK announced that they were exploring a new defence financing and procurement mechanism aimed at driving joint procurement(8). Coverage and funding · data table Instrument totals and coverage (● covered; — coverage not listed) Instrument Funding (€ billion) Period R&D industrial production procurement infrastructure and logistics external assistance MDM Not quantified Period not specified ● ● ● — — DSRB Not quantified Period not specified ● ● ● ● ● Circle area represents funding on a common €150 billion scale. Dots in category columns indicate coverage, not allocated funding. JavaScript is disabled. All data remain available in this table. By July 2026, Poland had joined the initiative, now known as the  Multilateral Defence Mechanism (MDM) . However, borrowing outside of the EU would mean that using the Union's tested borrowing infrastructure would not be possible, which would complicate debt issuance. Countries that can borrow more cheaply nationally may still question the value of such collective borrowing. Another idea is the proposal to set up a  Defence, Security and Resilience Bank (DSRB) , with defence financing as a core part of its mandate. The DSRB could mobilise capital that may not otherwise be available, support projects outside the EIB's comfort zone, and help bring together financing for defence-relevant infrastructure. However, governments would have to provide the initial capital, potentially adding to their overall debt levels. Moreover, the added value of a new bank may not be evident given the role already played by existing financial institutions such as the EIB in supporting defence investment. Still, the DSRB should be taken seriously. Indeed, the idea is gaining ground: in July 2026, Canada, Albania, Belgium, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, Romania, Türkiye and Ukraine announced their shared intention to establish the DSRB, with the aim of allowing it to begin operations as early as 2027. The MDM and the DSRB pursue the same broad objective as EU instruments: mobilising additional resources for European defence and making cooperative projects easier to finance. EU institutions could be associated with both mechanisms, helping to coordinate projects. The EU could also be a co-investor when this aligns with its own priorities. For example, EU grants could provide targeted top-ups, and Member States participating in MDM projects could combine these with SAFE-style loans, if projects meet EU eligibility criteria. 4. Mobilising private capital The private sector is playing a growing role in supporting Europe's defence ramp-up. Venture capital is a particularly important source of financing for emerging defence players. European defence start-ups are set to raise over €9 billion in 2026, four times as much as in 2025. Data also suggests that the EU is attracting a larger share of defence venture capital funding, with the EU share across NATO, Canada, Australia and New Zealand rising from 13% in 2024 to 21% in 2026.   Coverage and funding · data table Instrument totals and coverage (● covered; — coverage not listed) Instrument Funding (€ billion) Period R&D industrial production procurement infrastructure and logistics external assistance Private funding Not quantified Period not specified ● ● — — — NATO Innovation Fund Not quantified 2023-2038 ● — — — — NATO DIANA Not quantified 2025 ● — — — — Circle area represents funding on a common €150 billion scale. Dots in category columns indicate coverage, not allocated funding. JavaScript is disabled. All data remain available in this table. Aside from venture capital, the  traditional banking sector  also contributes to expanding Europe's defence production capacity. A number of European banks, such as ING, Deutsche Bank and Danske Bank, have expanded their defence financing activities by extending lending or setting up dedicated offices. Demand for defence-focused exchange-traded funds has also increased sharply. Flows into defence ETFs support valuations of listed companies, allowing them to raise capital more easily. However, they do not benefit unlisted companies. NATO instruments are also helping to mobilise private investment. The  NATO Innovation Fund  is a standalone venture capital fund, backed by 24 countries in NATO. It has around €1 billion in committed capital, which it aims to invest over 15 years. The fund operates independently of NATO and its founding countries. It invests in science and engineering start-ups developing emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) in fields such as energy, materials science, AI, quantum computing, biotechnology and space. In parallel, NATO's Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic ( DIANA ) provides defence start-ups with limited funding (€11 million in 2025), as well as highly valuable access to test centres and military users. The key challenge is mobilising  private capital  beyond funds with a high-risk appetite, looking for example to institutional investors such as pension funds, as well as private savers. Completing the EU Savings and Investments Union would be an important step, as it would allow private savings across Europe to be more easily and smoothly mobilised for defence investment. Another priority is to ensure that the Commission's December 2025 clarification of the EU sustainable-finance framework is consistently reflected in national practices, so that regulatory obstacles do not prevent large institutional investors, such as pension funds, from investing in defence. There are limits to what private capital can do. Private capital can provide additional resources and momentum for Europe's defence ramp-up. It can help promising defence investments get off the ground by allowing innovative companies that struggle to access financing to secure the funding needed to develop prototypes and pay contractors along their supply chains. Private capital may also have a role in defence-relevant infrastructure, especially where projects generate long-term revenues. However, these companies will still struggle to sustain and expand their operations unless they secure contracts from governments. Ultimately, the most useful thing that governments can do to better harness private capital is to focus on creating demand by providing clear, long-term signals about future defence needs. Conclusions Europeans face a major fiscal challenge in sustaining and increasing their defence spending. In reality, the challenge is twofold: on one hand governments need to maintain and expand defence spending; on the other Europe needs to mobilise the investment to strengthen its defence and secure its critical infrastructure. When it comes to the first challenge, national budgets remain the core. However, they can be complemented by other sources of finance. Additional EU-level grants can provide genuinely new resources for defence. There is a strategic choice to be made in terms of how much grant funding from the next EU budget goes to defence, and how much priority defence is given relative to other objectives. At the same time, new SAFE-style loans can allow Member States to spend more by leveraging the EU's collective credit rating to borrow more cheaply. Lending from the EIB and national promotional banks can finance specific projects and take some pressure off government budgets. Meanwhile, novel mechanisms such as the Multilateral Defence Mechanism and the Defence, Security and Resilience Bank could allow for cheaper government borrowing by harnessing the credibility of a broad group of governments and facilitating joint procurement. However, all loans taken out by governments will still add to government debt levels. Meeting the industrial and resilience challenge is different. If governments provide credible long-term demand, this can crowd in investment by public and private banks and private investors, allowing defence companies to invest in R&D, industrial expansion and so on. The surge in VC funding for defence shows that investors respond when they see a promising market. In the same way, government policy and public funding can attract private investment to help make Europe's infrastructure more resilient and therefore fit to deter adversaries. All this is helpful to Europe's broader defence ramp-up, and takes some of the burden of defence investment off governments. However, private finance does not in itself help governments maintain larger budgets or avoid difficult choices. Ultimately, Europe's defence surge will be sustained by national budgets. But Europeans should not shy away from drawing on the full range of defence financing tools at their disposal to reinforce national spending and amplify its impact. 1. European Innovation Council, 'EIC 2026 Work Programme', amended 17 June 2026 ( 2. See for example: European Investment Bank, 'Indra Group to step up research and development of defence and space technologies with €385 million in EIB financing', 15 July 2025 ( 3. European Investment Bank, 'EIB backs new military base in Lithuania with €540 million loan', 20 June 2025 ( 4. European Investment Bank, 'EIB triples financing for banks to provide liquidity to SMEs in the supply chain of Europe's defence industry, signs first deal with Deutsche Bank', 11 June 2025 ( 5. European Investment Bank, 'Quantum Systems secures new European financing package to scale the future of unmanned technologies', 12 February 2026 ( 6. Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK), 'BGK secures international financing for modernisation of Polish Army', 29 December 2025 ( 7. European Investment Bank, 'European promotional institutions and EIB join forces to support EU security and defence', 6 June 2025 ( 8. HM Treasury, 'Joint statement from Finland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom on joint defence financing and procurement', 17 March 2026 ( Disable Centered Alignment Off Image Image Not visible in views Off

Caspar Hobhouse on Europe's military fuel supply vulnerabilities Caspar Hobhouse on Europe's military fuel supply vulnerabilities marianna.liana… Wed, 10/28/2026 - 15:26 European armed forces rely on jet fuel for aviation and diesel for backup power at military bases. "In the case of a military conflict, the demand is enormous," Caspar Hobhouse told Euronews. With the war in Iran and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz disrupting supplies, Europe's fuel reserves would leave it "very, very short business" in the event of armed aggression without significant replenishment, he warned.   Press media Euronews
middle east

Caspar Hobhouse on Europe's military fuel supply vulnerabilities Caspar Hobhouse on Europe's military fuel supply vulnerabilities marianna.liana… Wed, 10/28/2026 - 15:26 European armed forces rely on jet fuel for aviation and diesel for backup power at military bases. "In the case of a military conflict, the demand is enormous," Caspar Hobhouse told Euronews. With the war in Iran and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz disrupting supplies, Europe's fuel reserves would leave it "very, very short business" in the event of armed aggression without significant replenishment, he warned.   Press media Euronews

Bojana Zorić on Serbia's democratic decline and how the EU can avoid the same mistakes it made with Georgia Bojana Zorić on Serbia's democratic decline and how the EU can avoid the same mistakes it made with Georgia marianna.liana… Fri, 10/23/2026 - 13:58 Bojana Zorić spoke to the New Union Post about the similarities and differences in democratic backsliding in Georgia and Serbia, and the lessons the EU can draw from its delayed response to developments in Georgia to prevent Serbia from following a similar path. "The key lesson is the importance of acting in time," she argued. "The EU should not wait until democratic backsliding develops into a deep institutional crisis before using the instruments at its disposal." Even though Serbia has not yet reached the same degree of institutional closure as Georgia, one of the most important parallels is the way democratic erosion unfolds in these countries: not as a single dramatic event, but rather "a gradual weakening of institutions, concentration of political power, and an increasingly pronounced blurring of state and party interests." Read the full analysis in the Brief, 'Too little, too late? Georgia's lessons for Serbia and EU leverage', co-written by Bojana and Tefta Kelmendi. Press media The New Union Post
serbia

Bojana Zorić on Serbia's democratic decline and how the EU can avoid the same mistakes it made with Georgia Bojana Zorić on Serbia's democratic decline and how the EU can avoid the same mistakes it made with Georgia marianna.liana… Fri, 10/23/2026 - 13:58 Bojana Zorić spoke to the New Union Post about the similarities and differences in democratic backsliding in Georgia and Serbia, and the lessons the EU can draw from its delayed response to developments in Georgia to prevent Serbia from following a similar path. "The key lesson is the importance of acting in time," she argued. "The EU should not wait until democratic backsliding develops into a deep institutional crisis before using the instruments at its disposal." Even though Serbia has not yet reached the same degree of institutional closure as Georgia, one of the most important parallels is the way democratic erosion unfolds in these countries: not as a single dramatic event, but rather "a gradual weakening of institutions, concentration of political power, and an increasingly pronounced blurring of state and party interests." Read the full analysis in the Brief, 'Too little, too late? Georgia's lessons for Serbia and EU leverage', co-written by Bojana and Tefta Kelmendi. Press media The New Union Post

Bojana Zorić on the deepening cooperation between the interior ministries of Serbia and Russia Bojana Zorić on the deepening cooperation between the interior ministries of Serbia and Russia marianna.liana… Fri, 10/23/2026 - 12:38 Discussing growing cooperation between the Serbian and Russian interior ministries, Bojana Zorić told Radio Slobodna Evropa, that it calls into question the long-term compatibility of Serbia's security policy with the European security framework.  "Such an approach may allow Belgrade to maintain relations with both sides in the short term, but in the long run it carries the risk of undermining the trust of European partners and further complicating Serbia's European integration process," she warned.  She argued that cooperation between the two countries in sensitive areas, such as criminal investigations, cybercrime and joint training, raises questions about the nature of the information being exchanged and poses potential risks, primarily of an intelligence-related and institutional nature. "What level of access do Russian officials have to Serbia's security structures, and are there adequate mechanisms in place to protect sensitive data?" Bojana stressed that even in the absence of direct exchanges of classified information, long-term institutional cooperation can provide deeper insights into a partner country's security procedures, operational methods and capabilities, potentially creating additional channels for political and security influence. (in Serbian) Press media Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
serbia

Bojana Zorić on the deepening cooperation between the interior ministries of Serbia and Russia Bojana Zorić on the deepening cooperation between the interior ministries of Serbia and Russia marianna.liana… Fri, 10/23/2026 - 12:38 Discussing growing cooperation between the Serbian and Russian interior ministries, Bojana Zorić told Radio Slobodna Evropa, that it calls into question the long-term compatibility of Serbia's security policy with the European security framework.  "Such an approach may allow Belgrade to maintain relations with both sides in the short term, but in the long run it carries the risk of undermining the trust of European partners and further complicating Serbia's European integration process," she warned.  She argued that cooperation between the two countries in sensitive areas, such as criminal investigations, cybercrime and joint training, raises questions about the nature of the information being exchanged and poses potential risks, primarily of an intelligence-related and institutional nature. "What level of access do Russian officials have to Serbia's security structures, and are there adequate mechanisms in place to protect sensitive data?" Bojana stressed that even in the absence of direct exchanges of classified information, long-term institutional cooperation can provide deeper insights into a partner country's security procedures, operational methods and capabilities, potentially creating additional channels for political and security influence. (in Serbian) Press media Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

Caspar Hobhouse's Brief cited in FOCUS online Caspar Hobhouse's Brief cited in FOCUS online marianna.liana… Thu, 10/22/2026 - 14:27 Caspar Hobhouse's Brief, 'The dragon in the grid: Limiting China's influence in Europe's energy system', was highlighted in a FOCUS online article on China's plans to introduce export controls on solar technology. The article cited his warning about China systematically embedding itself in global renewable energy supply chains. "There is a growing cyber threat linked to Chinese-made solar inverters, underscoring the need for a 'Made in Europe' requirement for critical infrastructure," he warned in the Brief. Press media FOCUS online
china

Caspar Hobhouse's Brief cited in FOCUS online Caspar Hobhouse's Brief cited in FOCUS online marianna.liana… Thu, 10/22/2026 - 14:27 Caspar Hobhouse's Brief, 'The dragon in the grid: Limiting China's influence in Europe's energy system', was highlighted in a FOCUS online article on China's plans to introduce export controls on solar technology. The article cited his warning about China systematically embedding itself in global renewable energy supply chains. "There is a growing cyber threat linked to Chinese-made solar inverters, underscoring the need for a 'Made in Europe' requirement for critical infrastructure," he warned in the Brief. Press media FOCUS online

Tim Rühlig on how Europe's antibiotic dependence on China can give Beijing strategic leverage Tim Rühlig on how Europe's antibiotic dependence on China can give Beijing strategic leverage marianna.liana… Thu, 10/22/2026 - 14:07 Up to 90% of global antibiotic active ingredients are now produced ​outside Europe, mainly in China. "This is something that you should worry about," warned Tim Rühlig in Reuters, noting that China's market dominance gives it leverage to defend its strategic interests.  Read his full analysis in the Commentary, 'The weak point: Why pharmaceutical security belongs at the heart of European defence'.   Press media Reuters
china

Tim Rühlig on how Europe's antibiotic dependence on China can give Beijing strategic leverage Tim Rühlig on how Europe's antibiotic dependence on China can give Beijing strategic leverage marianna.liana… Thu, 10/22/2026 - 14:07 Up to 90% of global antibiotic active ingredients are now produced ​outside Europe, mainly in China. "This is something that you should worry about," warned Tim Rühlig in Reuters, noting that China's market dominance gives it leverage to defend its strategic interests.  Read his full analysis in the Commentary, 'The weak point: Why pharmaceutical security belongs at the heart of European defence'.   Press media Reuters

"The key lesson from Georgia's experience is the importance of timely action." "The key lesson from Georgia's experience is the importance of timely action." marianna.liana… Thu, 10/22/2026 - 12:18 Following the publication of her latest Brief, 'Too little, too late? Georgia's lessons for Serbia and EU leverage', Bojana Zorić spoke to Insajder about the similarities and differences in democratic backsliding in Georgia and Serbia, and the lessons the EU can draw from its delayed response to Georgia to prevent Serbia from following the same path. "In both cases, this is not about a single dramatic event, but rather the gradual weakening of institutions, the concentration of political power, and the increasingly pronounced intertwining of state and party interests," she explained. Although both countries are moving away from democratic norms, Georgia has gone much further in state capture, while Serbia retains stronger economic ties with the EU and greater potential for social mobilisation, she added. She argued that Georgia's trajectory is not inevitable for Serbia, as the country has not yet reached the same degree of institutional closure. "However, that window of opportunity is not unlimited, and Georgia's experience shows just how quickly it can narrow," she warned. (in Serbian) Press media Insajder
georgia

"The key lesson from Georgia's experience is the importance of timely action." "The key lesson from Georgia's experience is the importance of timely action." marianna.liana… Thu, 10/22/2026 - 12:18 Following the publication of her latest Brief, 'Too little, too late? Georgia's lessons for Serbia and EU leverage', Bojana Zorić spoke to Insajder about the similarities and differences in democratic backsliding in Georgia and Serbia, and the lessons the EU can draw from its delayed response to Georgia to prevent Serbia from following the same path. "In both cases, this is not about a single dramatic event, but rather the gradual weakening of institutions, the concentration of political power, and the increasingly pronounced intertwining of state and party interests," she explained. Although both countries are moving away from democratic norms, Georgia has gone much further in state capture, while Serbia retains stronger economic ties with the EU and greater potential for social mobilisation, she added. She argued that Georgia's trajectory is not inevitable for Serbia, as the country has not yet reached the same degree of institutional closure. "However, that window of opportunity is not unlimited, and Georgia's experience shows just how quickly it can narrow," she warned. (in Serbian) Press media Insajder

Europe under pressure: what does it need to decide now?
world

Europe under pressure: what does it need to decide now?

EU Defence Spending EU Defence Spending christian.diet… Thu, 10/08/2026 - 10:45 18 minutes Introduction Defence budgets across Europe are rising. Russia's war on Ukraine, combined with doubts over the future of US security guarantees, have prompted European governments to invest more in defence. According to EUISS calculations based on EDA and NATO data, spending by EU Member States was 56% higher in 2025 than it was in 2022, after accounting for inflation. One challenge is sustaining and increasing this spending. Rebuilding Europe's military capacity will require investment over many years. Yet many national budgets are under pressure from fiscal constraints, higher borrowing costs and competing domestic priorities. Europeans also need to spend more cooperatively to reduce costs and secure economies of scale. The feasibility of cooperation is influenced by many factors, including national threat perceptions, operational cultures, defence planning cycles and national industrial interests, but well-designed financial incentives can make cooperation more attractive. A second challenge is mobilising the investment needed for Europe's broader defence ramp-up, in terms of expanding industrial capacity, investing in R&D and making European infrastructure more resilient and fit to withstand possible sabotage or attack. Europe's defence financing instruments can all play a role in meeting these challenges. This landscape has grown increasingly more complex. National budgets remain the main pillar of defence expenditure, but they are increasingly part of a wider ecosystem of EU instruments, public financial institutions like the European Investment Bank (EIB) and increasingly also private capital. This piece maps the landscape of European defence financing and assesses the growing number of proposals to expand and solidify this ecosystem, such as a repeat of SAFE or multilateral borrowing mechanisms outside the EU framework. Ultimately, there is no silver bullet for Europe's defence financing challenge. There is no alternative to sustained national spending, but it can and should be supplemented by additional sources of funding. While this will not remove the need for difficult fiscal choices, it will make higher defence spending easier to reach and help drive Europe's broader defence ramp-up. Europe's Defence Financing Ecosystem The Core: National Spending   EU Member States have significantly increased defence expenditure since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. In nominal terms, spending rose by approximately €89 bn between 2014 and 2022, reaching €239.75 bn. Since then, spending has risen to €417.62 bn in 2025, an increase of 74%.   Even after adjusting for inflation, spending increased by approximately 56% over this timespan. The current average level of spending represents 2.2% of the EU's €18.8tn GDP.   According to the EDA, spending will hit €454 billion in 2026, representing 2.4% of EU GDP.   Spending is set to grow even further, with Member States that are also NATO allies pledging to increase spending to 3.5% of GDP by 2035, plus 1.5% for defence related expenditure.   Raising 'core' defence spending to 3.5% of GDP would mean increasing annual spending to around €658bn. That means Europeans will need to find an additional €204bn EUR a year (in today's money) by 2035. This will put public finances across Europe under strain.   Beyond National Budgets: Four priorities to sustain Europe's defence surge As defence expenditures have grown, so has the range of funding streams that is complementing national budgets. EU instruments, funding from public banks and private finance can all contribute to giving momentum and coherence to Europe's defence ramp up. The rest of the piece sets out four priorities to sustain Europe's defence surge: Fully exploiting the EU's potential; Leveraging public financial institutions; Exploring joint borrowing beyond the EU; Mobilising private capital. Fully exploiting the EU's potential The EU is the most important layer of defence financing beyond national budgets, and it already has a range of instruments to support defence. These are mapped below. In essence the EU can add value in three ways: by mobilising additional resources, by embedding defence priorities across the wider EU budget, and by using financial incentives to make cooperation more attractive for companies and Member States. The EU is already adding significant resources to European defence expenditure, both in terms of strengthening European defences and supporting Ukraine.   The  SAFE  loan mechanism provides €150bn in low interest long-term loans to Member States. In essence it allows those with higher borrowing costs than the EU itself to invest more in defence at a lower cost than through national borrowing.   The €90bn  Ukraine Support loan , covering 2026 and 2027 is a major element of European defence spending. Around two thirds of the loan, which is financed via EU borrowing, is meant to support Ukraine's defence, mainly through purchases of military equipment.   The European Defence Fund ( EDF ) has a budget of €7.3bn for 2021-27 to finance co-operative R&D. In 2024, the EDF was worth an additional 9% on top of national defence R&D budgets.   The Act in Support of Ammunition Production ( ASAP ) was a short-term €500mn programme to ramp-up ammunition production capacity in Europe between 2023 and 2025. It leveraged limited EU funding to support 31 projects in 15 Member States through targeted funding. It resulted in an investment of €1.5 bln in the supply chain and contributed to the six-fold increase in production capacity of 155mm shells since 2022.   The European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act ( EDIRPA ) provided €310 million to foster joint procurement between 2023 and 2025. It funded five cross-border procurement projects covering air and missile defence systems, ammunition, and armoured vehicles.   The European Defence Industry Programme ( EDIP ) has a budget of €1.5bn for 2026 and 2027. It is taking forward the ASAP and EDIRPA funding logics, while also providing dedicated funding to support Ukraine and promote its integration with Europe's defence-industrial base and for projects of common European interest.   The European Peace Facility ( EPF ) is an off-budget EU instrument worth €17bn between 2021 and 2027. It aims to support EU military operations and/or assistance to partner countries, including lethal equipment and training.   Beyond these defence specific instruments, other EU instruments are also indirectly contributing to providing additional resources.   The Connecting Europe Facility ( CEF ) with a budget of €1.7bn in EU grants (2021-27) has been used to strengthen dual-use transport infrastructure and facilitate cross-border military mobility, supporting 95 dual-use transport infrastructure projects across 21 Member States.   The European Innovation Council ( EIC ) is also involved in supporting defence. The EIC Accelerator, worth €634mn in 2026, supports start-ups, SMEs and small mid-caps developing disruptive technologies, including dual-use technologies. Meanwhile, in June 2026 the EIC's Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP) Scale Up Scheme announced €100 million in funding for defence technologies including air and missile defence, artillery, and drones and counter drones.   Finally,  Cohesion funds  can be used to support defence. In March 2026, the Commission reported that Member States had agreed to reprogram €11.9bn in 2021-2027 cohesion funds towards defence and dual-use investments.   Aside from providing additional resources for defence, EU instruments can also make cooperation more attractive, helping make European defence spending more efficient. For example, the EDF has contributed to the creation of partnerships between European defence companies that would probably not have otherwise worked together. On the demand side, EDIRPA, EDIP and SAFE have the same purpose.    EDIRPA  showed the potential of targeted EU incentives on cooperation: the original budget leveraged €11 billion (36 times its envelope) in joint procurement orders, with each project involving an average of six Member States. While this volume reflected pre-existing national requirements, EDIRPA helped governments aggregate their national requirements into joint orders.    SAFE  is also meant to encourage joint procurement, although the degree to which it will do so remains to be seen, as it allows carve-outs for some national projects and cooperation will also depend on whether Member States' capability needs and procurement timelines align.   Meanwhile,  EDIP  is meant to carry forward the logic of EDIRPA, with €240 million to foster collaborative procurement carried out by at least 3 Member States across 5 capability areas (counter UAS, ammunition, missile, air and missile defence, ground and naval platforms, C5ISR and space); and €325 million for European Defence Projects of Common Interest, such as drones, protection of critical undersea infrastructure and air and missile defence.   There is a strong case for expanding EU defence funding, and to use it more strategically by targeting funding at key capability priorities and at joint projects. First, the EU can provide cheap financing to Member States with limited fiscal space. This is valuable in itself as it takes some pressure off national budgets and will allow Member States to increase and sustain defence spending. Additional EU financing could take the form of loans or grants. An extension of the Ukraine loan past 2027 should be a priority. In terms of funding Europe's own defences, loan-based instruments are politically more practicable as individual governments are responsible for repayment. The 2028–2034 EU budget could be a sizeable source of defence funding. The Commission has proposed allocating €131 billion to defence, security and space, though this figure could be reduced. Much will also depend on how much of this envelope would go to defence specifically, and what funding logic it would follow. Looking beyond the MFF, the idea of EU defence bonds remains a harder sell. Repayments fall on all Member States, and for many it is cheaper to raise and spend money nationally. Nevertheless, these concerns could potentially be overcome through mechanisms to tightly target spending at agreed priorities with clear added value for all Member States. Second, EU funding can increase the efficiency of European defence spending by driving cooperation, reducing fragmentation and enabling projects that may otherwise not have been possible. A repeat of SAFE, if linked exclusively to joint rather than national procurement, could help drive cooperation more strongly. Other inducements aside from tightening eligibility criteria could include selecting fewer projects but with a higher financing rate and focusing funding on emerging areas where there are fewer established national industrial players. The key will be striking a balance between the criteria, the funding and the design of any future funding instrument. Forcing cooperation in large groups is likely to backfire, as modest financing cannot substitute for political alignment, shared threat perceptions and common capability priorities. Conversely, financing aimed at fostering the emergence of groupings with a shared vision is more likely to lead to concrete results. Third, looking beyond the EU's defence instruments to the Union's broader toolkit and budget, the priority should be embedding defence considerations horizontally across EU instruments as much as possible. For example, any defence elements of a proposal should be taken into account as fully as possible when evaluating projects in areas such as innovation, regional policy, energy, digital connectivity or transport. Leveraging the role of public financial institutions Harnessing the role of public financial institutions should be a second priority. In recent years these have taken a growing role in funding defence, above all the European Investment Bank, but also other national promotional banks.   Historically, the EIB's lending policy was limited to a "dual-use" framework. This began to change in 2022, when the EIB launched its Strategic European Security Initiative, and accelerated significantly from 2024, when the Bank broadened its eligibility criteria for security and defence investments. The EIB's annual defence lending has rapidly grown, from €1.2 bn in 2024 to over €4 billion in 2025.   The EIB is involved in defence investment in four ways. First, the EIB supports defence R&D, providing loans to defence companies. Second, the EIB finances defence-related and dual-use infrastructure, including projects such a military base in Lithuania. Third, it strengthens the defence industrial base by supporting supply-chain finance and providing capital for companies operating in the security and defence ecosystem. Fourth, the EIB invests in venture-capital and private-equity funds supporting defence start-ups and SMEs through its €175 million Defence Equity Facility.   However, the EIB is not designed to finance ordinary defence procurement. Its shareholders also remain sensitive to maintaining the Bank's AAA rating. While the EIB can help lower financing costs, it cannot replace national defence budgets or procure military equipment directly.   National public institutions    National public institutions  could become a key source of support for Europe's defence build-up. A key focus is R&D. For example, of the top-10 active investors in defence, security, and resilience in Europe in 2025 at (pre-)seed level, 6 were public entities.   Beyond R&D, national public banks have also supported industrial production and military procurement. For example, Germany's KFW has partnered with the EIB and other banks to support drone manufacturer Quantum Systems in scaling production. Poland's BGK, which operates the Armed Forces Support Fund, has raised capital to support the purchase of Korean K2 tanks.   Public banks also support dual-use infrastructure projects. For instance, in June 2025, the EIB agreed with France's Caisse des Dépôts, Germany's KfW, Italy's CDP, Poland's BGK and Spain's ICO to explore potential joint financing for security and defence, including in infrastructure.   Fully harnessing the EIB's potential should be a priority. There are obstacles to greater involvement of the Bank in pure defence, not least in terms of the level of risk in some defence investments which could put at risk the EIB's AAA rating. Nevertheless, there is a strong case for the Bank to further expand defence lending. For example the EIB could help derisk investments in joint production by Ukrainian and European companies in the EU. More broadly, the EIB could take on a larger role in financing upgrades to critical infrastructure, including to support military mobility. Explore joint borrowing mechanisms beyond existing frameworks There is growing discussion of borrowing mechanisms beyond the EU framework. One reason is that finding agreement between a small group of countries could be easier than at 27, and it would also be easier to include non-EU partners such as the UK or Norway. Some options are already being explored. In March 2026, Finland, the Netherlands and the UK have announced that they are exploring a new defence financing and procurement mechanism aimed at driving joint procurement.   By July 2026, Poland had joined the initiative, now termed  Multilateral Defence Mechanism (MDM) . However, borrowing outside of the EU would mean that using the Union's tested borrowing infrastructure would not be possible, which would complicate the debt issuance. Countries that can borrow more cheaply nationally may continue to question the value of such collective borrowing.   Another idea is the proposal to set up a  Defence Security and Resilience Bank (DSRB) . Such a bank would have defence as part of its core mandate and would therefore be freer than the EIB. However, governments would have to pay in the initial capital, adding to overall debt levels. Moreover, the added value of a new Bank may not be evident when compared to existing defence lending mechanisms such as the EIB. Still, the DSRB should be taken seriously. Indeed, the idea is gaining ground: in July 2026, Canada, Albania, Belgium, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, Romania, Türkiye and Ukraine announced their shared intention to establish the DSRB, with the aim of allowing it to begin operations as early as 2027. The DSRB could mobilise capital that may not otherwise be available, support projects outside the EIB's comfort zone, and help bring together financing for defence-relevant infrastructure.   The MDM and the DSRB pursue the same broad objective as EU instruments: mobilising additional resources for European defence and making cooperative projects easier to finance. EU institutions could be associated with both mechanisms, helping align projects with EU priorities. The EU could also be a co-investor when this aligns with its own priorities. For example, EU grants could provide targeted top-ups, and Member States participating in MDM projects could combine these with SAFE-style loans, if projects meet EU eligibility criteria. Mobilise private funding The private sector is playing a growing role in supporting Europe's defence ramp-up. Venture capital is a particularly important source of financing for emerging defence players. European defence start-ups are set to raise over €9 billion in 2026, a fourfold increase over 2025. Data also suggests that the EU is attracting a larger share of defence venture capital funding, with the EU share across NATO, Canada, Australia and New Zealand rising from 13% in 2024 to 21% in 2026.     Aside from venture capital, the traditional banking sector also contributes to expanding Europe's defence production capacity. A number of European banks, such as ING, Deutsche Bank and Danske Bank, have expanded their defence financing activities by expanding lending or setting up dedicated offices.  Banks  are often working alongside public financial institutions to fund defence. For example, in 2026 Commerzbank and Deutsche Bank joined the EIB and KfW in providing a €150 million financing package for German drone manufacturer Quantum Systems, supporting investment in technology, industrial capacity and organisational growth. Demand for defence-focused ETFs has also increased sharply. Assets in European-listed defence ETFs more than quadrupled to $13.57 billion during the first half of 2025. Flows into defence ETFs support valuations of listed companies, allowing them to raise capital more easily. However, they do not benefit unlisted companies.   NATO instruments are also helping to mobilise private investment. The  NATO Innovation Fund  is a standalone venture capital fund, backed by 24 countries in NATO. It has around €1 billion in committed capital, which it aims to invest over 15 years. The fund operates independently of NATO and its founding countries. It invests in cutting-edge science and engineering startups developing emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) in fields such as energy, materials science, AI, quantum computing, biotechnology, and space.   In parallel, NATO's Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic ( DIANA ) provides defence start-ups with limited funding (€11 million in 2025), as well as highly valuable access to test centres and military users.   The key challenge is mobilising  private capital  beyond venture funds with a high-risk appetite, looking for example to institutional investors such as pension funds, as well as private savers. Completing the Capital Markets Union would be an important step, as it would allow private savings across Europe to be more easily and smoothly mobilised for defence investment. Another priority is ensuring that the Commission's December 2025 clarification of the EU sustainable-finance framework is consistently reflected in national practice, to ensure that there are no EU or national regulatory obstacles to large institutional investors such as pensions funds investing in defence.   There are limits to what private capital can do. Private capital can provide additional resources and momentum for Europe's defence ramp up. It can help promising defence investments get off the ground by allowing promising companies that struggle to access financing to secure funding, building prototypes and paying contractors down their supply chains. Private capital may also have a role in defence-relevant infrastructure, especially where projects generate long-term revenues. However, these companies will still struggle to sustain and expand their operations unless they secure contracts from governments. Ultimately the most useful thing that governments can do to better harness private capital is focusing on creating demand through long-term demand signals. Conclusions Europeans face a major fiscal challenge in sustaining and increasing defence spending. In reality the challenge is dual: on one hand governments need to sustain and expand defence spending; on the other Europe needs to mobilise the investment to strengthen its defence and secure its critical infrastructure. When it comes to the first challenge, national budgets remain the core. However, they can be complemented by additional sources of finance. Additional EU level grants can provide genuinely new resources for defence. There is a strategic choice to be made in terms of how much grant style funding from the next EU budget goes to defence, and how much priority defence is given relative to other objectives. At the same time, new SAFE style loans can allow Member States to spend more by leveraging the EU's collective credit rating to borrow more cheaply. Lending from the EIB and national promotional banks can finance specific projects and take some pressure off government budgets. Novel mechanisms such as the Multilateral Defence Mechanism and the Defence, Security and Resilience Bank could allow for cheaper government borrowing by harnessing the credibility of a broad group of governments and facilitate joint procurement. However, all loans taken out by governments will still add to government debt levels. Meeting the industrial and resilience challenge is different. If governments provide credible long-term demand, this can crowd in investment by public and private banks and private investors, allowing defence companies to invest in R&D, industrial expansion and so on. The surge in VC capitals shows that investors crowd in where they see a growing market. In the same way, government policy and public funding can also crowd in private investment to help make Europe's infrastructure more resilient and fit to deter an adversary. All this is helpful to Europe's broader defence ramp up, and takes some of the burden of defence investment off governments. However, private finance does not itself help governments maintain larger budgets or avoid difficult choices. Ultimately, Europe's defence surge will be sustained by national budgets. But Europeans should not shy away from drawing on the full range of defence financing tools at their disposal to reinforce national spending and amplify its impact. Disable Centered Alignment Off Image Image Not visible in views On
european union

EU Defence Spending EU Defence Spending christian.diet… Thu, 10/08/2026 - 10:45 18 minutes Introduction Defence budgets across Europe are rising. Russia's war on Ukraine, combined with doubts over the future of US security guarantees, have prompted European governments to invest more in defence. According to EUISS calculations based on EDA and NATO data, spending by EU Member States was 56% higher in 2025 than it was in 2022, after accounting for inflation. One challenge is sustaining and increasing this spending. Rebuilding Europe's military capacity will require investment over many years. Yet many national budgets are under pressure from fiscal constraints, higher borrowing costs and competing domestic priorities. Europeans also need to spend more cooperatively to reduce costs and secure economies of scale. The feasibility of cooperation is influenced by many factors, including national threat perceptions, operational cultures, defence planning cycles and national industrial interests, but well-designed financial incentives can make cooperation more attractive. A second challenge is mobilising the investment needed for Europe's broader defence ramp-up, in terms of expanding industrial capacity, investing in R&D and making European infrastructure more resilient and fit to withstand possible sabotage or attack. Europe's defence financing instruments can all play a role in meeting these challenges. This landscape has grown increasingly more complex. National budgets remain the main pillar of defence expenditure, but they are increasingly part of a wider ecosystem of EU instruments, public financial institutions like the European Investment Bank (EIB) and increasingly also private capital. This piece maps the landscape of European defence financing and assesses the growing number of proposals to expand and solidify this ecosystem, such as a repeat of SAFE or multilateral borrowing mechanisms outside the EU framework. Ultimately, there is no silver bullet for Europe's defence financing challenge. There is no alternative to sustained national spending, but it can and should be supplemented by additional sources of funding. While this will not remove the need for difficult fiscal choices, it will make higher defence spending easier to reach and help drive Europe's broader defence ramp-up. Europe's Defence Financing Ecosystem The Core: National Spending   EU Member States have significantly increased defence expenditure since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. In nominal terms, spending rose by approximately €89 bn between 2014 and 2022, reaching €239.75 bn. Since then, spending has risen to €417.62 bn in 2025, an increase of 74%.   Even after adjusting for inflation, spending increased by approximately 56% over this timespan. The current average level of spending represents 2.2% of the EU's €18.8tn GDP.   According to the EDA, spending will hit €454 billion in 2026, representing 2.4% of EU GDP.   Spending is set to grow even further, with Member States that are also NATO allies pledging to increase spending to 3.5% of GDP by 2035, plus 1.5% for defence related expenditure.   Raising 'core' defence spending to 3.5% of GDP would mean increasing annual spending to around €658bn. That means Europeans will need to find an additional €204bn EUR a year (in today's money) by 2035. This will put public finances across Europe under strain.   Beyond National Budgets: Four priorities to sustain Europe's defence surge As defence expenditures have grown, so has the range of funding streams that is complementing national budgets. EU instruments, funding from public banks and private finance can all contribute to giving momentum and coherence to Europe's defence ramp up. The rest of the piece sets out four priorities to sustain Europe's defence surge: Fully exploiting the EU's potential; Leveraging public financial institutions; Exploring joint borrowing beyond the EU; Mobilising private capital. Fully exploiting the EU's potential The EU is the most important layer of defence financing beyond national budgets, and it already has a range of instruments to support defence. These are mapped below. In essence the EU can add value in three ways: by mobilising additional resources, by embedding defence priorities across the wider EU budget, and by using financial incentives to make cooperation more attractive for companies and Member States. The EU is already adding significant resources to European defence expenditure, both in terms of strengthening European defences and supporting Ukraine.   The  SAFE  loan mechanism provides €150bn in low interest long-term loans to Member States. In essence it allows those with higher borrowing costs than the EU itself to invest more in defence at a lower cost than through national borrowing.   The €90bn  Ukraine Support loan , covering 2026 and 2027 is a major element of European defence spending. Around two thirds of the loan, which is financed via EU borrowing, is meant to support Ukraine's defence, mainly through purchases of military equipment.   The European Defence Fund ( EDF ) has a budget of €7.3bn for 2021-27 to finance co-operative R&D. In 2024, the EDF was worth an additional 9% on top of national defence R&D budgets.   The Act in Support of Ammunition Production ( ASAP ) was a short-term €500mn programme to ramp-up ammunition production capacity in Europe between 2023 and 2025. It leveraged limited EU funding to support 31 projects in 15 Member States through targeted funding. It resulted in an investment of €1.5 bln in the supply chain and contributed to the six-fold increase in production capacity of 155mm shells since 2022.   The European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act ( EDIRPA ) provided €310 million to foster joint procurement between 2023 and 2025. It funded five cross-border procurement projects covering air and missile defence systems, ammunition, and armoured vehicles.   The European Defence Industry Programme ( EDIP ) has a budget of €1.5bn for 2026 and 2027. It is taking forward the ASAP and EDIRPA funding logics, while also providing dedicated funding to support Ukraine and promote its integration with Europe's defence-industrial base and for projects of common European interest.   The European Peace Facility ( EPF ) is an off-budget EU instrument worth €17bn between 2021 and 2027. It aims to support EU military operations and/or assistance to partner countries, including lethal equipment and training.   Beyond these defence specific instruments, other EU instruments are also indirectly contributing to providing additional resources.   The Connecting Europe Facility ( CEF ) with a budget of €1.7bn in EU grants (2021-27) has been used to strengthen dual-use transport infrastructure and facilitate cross-border military mobility, supporting 95 dual-use transport infrastructure projects across 21 Member States.   The European Innovation Council ( EIC ) is also involved in supporting defence. The EIC Accelerator, worth €634mn in 2026, supports start-ups, SMEs and small mid-caps developing disruptive technologies, including dual-use technologies. Meanwhile, in June 2026 the EIC's Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP) Scale Up Scheme announced €100 million in funding for defence technologies including air and missile defence, artillery, and drones and counter drones.   Finally,  Cohesion funds  can be used to support defence. In March 2026, the Commission reported that Member States had agreed to reprogram €11.9bn in 2021-2027 cohesion funds towards defence and dual-use investments.   Aside from providing additional resources for defence, EU instruments can also make cooperation more attractive, helping make European defence spending more efficient. For example, the EDF has contributed to the creation of partnerships between European defence companies that would probably not have otherwise worked together. On the demand side, EDIRPA, EDIP and SAFE have the same purpose.    EDIRPA  showed the potential of targeted EU incentives on cooperation: the original budget leveraged €11 billion (36 times its envelope) in joint procurement orders, with each project involving an average of six Member States. While this volume reflected pre-existing national requirements, EDIRPA helped governments aggregate their national requirements into joint orders.    SAFE  is also meant to encourage joint procurement, although the degree to which it will do so remains to be seen, as it allows carve-outs for some national projects and cooperation will also depend on whether Member States' capability needs and procurement timelines align.   Meanwhile,  EDIP  is meant to carry forward the logic of EDIRPA, with €240 million to foster collaborative procurement carried out by at least 3 Member States across 5 capability areas (counter UAS, ammunition, missile, air and missile defence, ground and naval platforms, C5ISR and space); and €325 million for European Defence Projects of Common Interest, such as drones, protection of critical undersea infrastructure and air and missile defence.   There is a strong case for expanding EU defence funding, and to use it more strategically by targeting funding at key capability priorities and at joint projects. First, the EU can provide cheap financing to Member States with limited fiscal space. This is valuable in itself as it takes some pressure off national budgets and will allow Member States to increase and sustain defence spending. Additional EU financing could take the form of loans or grants. An extension of the Ukraine loan past 2027 should be a priority. In terms of funding Europe's own defences, loan-based instruments are politically more practicable as individual governments are responsible for repayment. The 2028–2034 EU budget could be a sizeable source of defence funding. The Commission has proposed allocating €131 billion to defence, security and space, though this figure could be reduced. Much will also depend on how much of this envelope would go to defence specifically, and what funding logic it would follow. Looking beyond the MFF, the idea of EU defence bonds remains a harder sell. Repayments fall on all Member States, and for many it is cheaper to raise and spend money nationally. Nevertheless, these concerns could potentially be overcome through mechanisms to tightly target spending at agreed priorities with clear added value for all Member States. Second, EU funding can increase the efficiency of European defence spending by driving cooperation, reducing fragmentation and enabling projects that may otherwise not have been possible. A repeat of SAFE, if linked exclusively to joint rather than national procurement, could help drive cooperation more strongly. Other inducements aside from tightening eligibility criteria could include selecting fewer projects but with a higher financing rate and focusing funding on emerging areas where there are fewer established national industrial players. The key will be striking a balance between the criteria, the funding and the design of any future funding instrument. Forcing cooperation in large groups is likely to backfire, as modest financing cannot substitute for political alignment, shared threat perceptions and common capability priorities. Conversely, financing aimed at fostering the emergence of groupings with a shared vision is more likely to lead to concrete results. Third, looking beyond the EU's defence instruments to the Union's broader toolkit and budget, the priority should be embedding defence considerations horizontally across EU instruments as much as possible. For example, any defence elements of a proposal should be taken into account as fully as possible when evaluating projects in areas such as innovation, regional policy, energy, digital connectivity or transport. Leveraging the role of public financial institutions Harnessing the role of public financial institutions should be a second priority. In recent years these have taken a growing role in funding defence, above all the European Investment Bank, but also other national promotional banks.   Historically, the EIB's lending policy was limited to a "dual-use" framework. This began to change in 2022, when the EIB launched its Strategic European Security Initiative, and accelerated significantly from 2024, when the Bank broadened its eligibility criteria for security and defence investments. The EIB's annual defence lending has rapidly grown, from €1.2 bn in 2024 to over €4 billion in 2025.   The EIB is involved in defence investment in four ways. First, the EIB supports defence R&D, providing loans to defence companies. Second, the EIB finances defence-related and dual-use infrastructure, including projects such a military base in Lithuania. Third, it strengthens the defence industrial base by supporting supply-chain finance and providing capital for companies operating in the security and defence ecosystem. Fourth, the EIB invests in venture-capital and private-equity funds supporting defence start-ups and SMEs through its €175 million Defence Equity Facility.   However, the EIB is not designed to finance ordinary defence procurement. Its shareholders also remain sensitive to maintaining the Bank's AAA rating. While the EIB can help lower financing costs, it cannot replace national defence budgets or procure military equipment directly.   National public institutions    National public institutions  could become a key source of support for Europe's defence build-up. A key focus is R&D. For example, of the top-10 active investors in defence, security, and resilience in Europe in 2025 at (pre-)seed level, 6 were public entities.   Beyond R&D, national public banks have also supported industrial production and military procurement. For example, Germany's KFW has partnered with the EIB and other banks to support drone manufacturer Quantum Systems in scaling production. Poland's BGK, which operates the Armed Forces Support Fund, has raised capital to support the purchase of Korean K2 tanks.   Public banks also support dual-use infrastructure projects. For instance, in June 2025, the EIB agreed with France's Caisse des Dépôts, Germany's KfW, Italy's CDP, Poland's BGK and Spain's ICO to explore potential joint financing for security and defence, including in infrastructure.   Fully harnessing the EIB's potential should be a priority. There are obstacles to greater involvement of the Bank in pure defence, not least in terms of the level of risk in some defence investments which could put at risk the EIB's AAA rating. Nevertheless, there is a strong case for the Bank to further expand defence lending. For example the EIB could help derisk investments in joint production by Ukrainian and European companies in the EU. More broadly, the EIB could take on a larger role in financing upgrades to critical infrastructure, including to support military mobility. Explore joint borrowing mechanisms beyond existing frameworks There is growing discussion of borrowing mechanisms beyond the EU framework. One reason is that finding agreement between a small group of countries could be easier than at 27, and it would also be easier to include non-EU partners such as the UK or Norway. Some options are already being explored. In March 2026, Finland, the Netherlands and the UK have announced that they are exploring a new defence financing and procurement mechanism aimed at driving joint procurement.   By July 2026, Poland had joined the initiative, now termed  Multilateral Defence Mechanism (MDM) . However, borrowing outside of the EU would mean that using the Union's tested borrowing infrastructure would not be possible, which would complicate the debt issuance. Countries that can borrow more cheaply nationally may continue to question the value of such collective borrowing.   Another idea is the proposal to set up a  Defence Security and Resilience Bank (DSRB) . Such a bank would have defence as part of its core mandate and would therefore be freer than the EIB. However, governments would have to pay in the initial capital, adding to overall debt levels. Moreover, the added value of a new Bank may not be evident when compared to existing defence lending mechanisms such as the EIB. Still, the DSRB should be taken seriously. Indeed, the idea is gaining ground: in July 2026, Canada, Albania, Belgium, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, Romania, Türkiye and Ukraine announced their shared intention to establish the DSRB, with the aim of allowing it to begin operations as early as 2027. The DSRB could mobilise capital that may not otherwise be available, support projects outside the EIB's comfort zone, and help bring together financing for defence-relevant infrastructure.   The MDM and the DSRB pursue the same broad objective as EU instruments: mobilising additional resources for European defence and making cooperative projects easier to finance. EU institutions could be associated with both mechanisms, helping align projects with EU priorities. The EU could also be a co-investor when this aligns with its own priorities. For example, EU grants could provide targeted top-ups, and Member States participating in MDM projects could combine these with SAFE-style loans, if projects meet EU eligibility criteria. Mobilise private funding The private sector is playing a growing role in supporting Europe's defence ramp-up. Venture capital is a particularly important source of financing for emerging defence players. European defence start-ups are set to raise over €9 billion in 2026, a fourfold increase over 2025. Data also suggests that the EU is attracting a larger share of defence venture capital funding, with the EU share across NATO, Canada, Australia and New Zealand rising from 13% in 2024 to 21% in 2026.     Aside from venture capital, the traditional banking sector also contributes to expanding Europe's defence production capacity. A number of European banks, such as ING, Deutsche Bank and Danske Bank, have expanded their defence financing activities by expanding lending or setting up dedicated offices.  Banks  are often working alongside public financial institutions to fund defence. For example, in 2026 Commerzbank and Deutsche Bank joined the EIB and KfW in providing a €150 million financing package for German drone manufacturer Quantum Systems, supporting investment in technology, industrial capacity and organisational growth. Demand for defence-focused ETFs has also increased sharply. Assets in European-listed defence ETFs more than quadrupled to $13.57 billion during the first half of 2025. Flows into defence ETFs support valuations of listed companies, allowing them to raise capital more easily. However, they do not benefit unlisted companies.   NATO instruments are also helping to mobilise private investment. The  NATO Innovation Fund  is a standalone venture capital fund, backed by 24 countries in NATO. It has around €1 billion in committed capital, which it aims to invest over 15 years. The fund operates independently of NATO and its founding countries. It invests in cutting-edge science and engineering startups developing emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) in fields such as energy, materials science, AI, quantum computing, biotechnology, and space.   In parallel, NATO's Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic ( DIANA ) provides defence start-ups with limited funding (€11 million in 2025), as well as highly valuable access to test centres and military users.   The key challenge is mobilising  private capital  beyond venture funds with a high-risk appetite, looking for example to institutional investors such as pension funds, as well as private savers. Completing the Capital Markets Union would be an important step, as it would allow private savings across Europe to be more easily and smoothly mobilised for defence investment. Another priority is ensuring that the Commission's December 2025 clarification of the EU sustainable-finance framework is consistently reflected in national practice, to ensure that there are no EU or national regulatory obstacles to large institutional investors such as pensions funds investing in defence.   There are limits to what private capital can do. Private capital can provide additional resources and momentum for Europe's defence ramp up. It can help promising defence investments get off the ground by allowing promising companies that struggle to access financing to secure funding, building prototypes and paying contractors down their supply chains. Private capital may also have a role in defence-relevant infrastructure, especially where projects generate long-term revenues. However, these companies will still struggle to sustain and expand their operations unless they secure contracts from governments. Ultimately the most useful thing that governments can do to better harness private capital is focusing on creating demand through long-term demand signals. Conclusions Europeans face a major fiscal challenge in sustaining and increasing defence spending. In reality the challenge is dual: on one hand governments need to sustain and expand defence spending; on the other Europe needs to mobilise the investment to strengthen its defence and secure its critical infrastructure. When it comes to the first challenge, national budgets remain the core. However, they can be complemented by additional sources of finance. Additional EU level grants can provide genuinely new resources for defence. There is a strategic choice to be made in terms of how much grant style funding from the next EU budget goes to defence, and how much priority defence is given relative to other objectives. At the same time, new SAFE style loans can allow Member States to spend more by leveraging the EU's collective credit rating to borrow more cheaply. Lending from the EIB and national promotional banks can finance specific projects and take some pressure off government budgets. Novel mechanisms such as the Multilateral Defence Mechanism and the Defence, Security and Resilience Bank could allow for cheaper government borrowing by harnessing the credibility of a broad group of governments and facilitate joint procurement. However, all loans taken out by governments will still add to government debt levels. Meeting the industrial and resilience challenge is different. If governments provide credible long-term demand, this can crowd in investment by public and private banks and private investors, allowing defence companies to invest in R&D, industrial expansion and so on. The surge in VC capitals shows that investors crowd in where they see a growing market. In the same way, government policy and public funding can also crowd in private investment to help make Europe's infrastructure more resilient and fit to deter an adversary. All this is helpful to Europe's broader defence ramp up, and takes some of the burden of defence investment off governments. However, private finance does not itself help governments maintain larger budgets or avoid difficult choices. Ultimately, Europe's defence surge will be sustained by national budgets. But Europeans should not shy away from drawing on the full range of defence financing tools at their disposal to reinforce national spending and amplify its impact. Disable Centered Alignment Off Image Image Not visible in views On

Tim Rühlig on what the Trump-Xi meeting means for Ukraine Tim Rühlig on what the Trump-Xi meeting means for Ukraine marianna.liana… Wed, 10/07/2026 - 11:17 According to Tim Rühlig, Beijing is not necessarily interested in an indefinite continuation of hostilities between Russia and Ukraine. China could orchestrate a "hybrid peace" scenario, in which the active phase of the war would cease while the Russian threat to Europe persists. Under such a scenario, Western attention would remain focused primarily on Europe rather than East Asia," he explained to Radio Liberty. (in Ukrainian)
ukraine

Tim Rühlig on what the Trump-Xi meeting means for Ukraine Tim Rühlig on what the Trump-Xi meeting means for Ukraine marianna.liana… Wed, 10/07/2026 - 11:17 According to Tim Rühlig, Beijing is not necessarily interested in an indefinite continuation of hostilities between Russia and Ukraine. China could orchestrate a "hybrid peace" scenario, in which the active phase of the war would cease while the Russian threat to Europe persists. Under such a scenario, Western attention would remain focused primarily on Europe rather than East Asia," he explained to Radio Liberty. (in Ukrainian)

Giuseppe Spatafora quoted in Diari ARA Giuseppe Spatafora quoted in Diari ARA marianna.liana… Wed, 10/07/2026 - 11:21 The new trilateral security deal signed by the US, Denmark, and Greenland is "a good agreement for Europe," said Giuseppe Spatafora to Diari ARA, "as it further binds the US to the defense of NATO's northern flank". However, trust between the partners remains deeply eroded, and it will be difficult to forget the previous strains in transatlantic relations.
united states of america

Giuseppe Spatafora quoted in Diari ARA Giuseppe Spatafora quoted in Diari ARA marianna.liana… Wed, 10/07/2026 - 11:21 The new trilateral security deal signed by the US, Denmark, and Greenland is "a good agreement for Europe," said Giuseppe Spatafora to Diari ARA, "as it further binds the US to the defense of NATO's northern flank". However, trust between the partners remains deeply eroded, and it will be difficult to forget the previous strains in transatlantic relations.

Tim Rühlig interviewed by France 24 on President Xi's Washington visit Tim Rühlig interviewed by France 24 on President Xi's Washington visit marianna.liana… Wed, 10/07/2026 - 11:24 Tim Rühlig joined France 24 to discuss President Xi's visit to Washington and what President Trump hailed as a "truly great friendship" between the two leaders. He also shared his assessment of the extension of the US-China trade truce, the Taiwan issue, and whether there is any room for cooperation between the two countries in the AI race.
united states of america

Tim Rühlig interviewed by France 24 on President Xi's Washington visit Tim Rühlig interviewed by France 24 on President Xi's Washington visit marianna.liana… Wed, 10/07/2026 - 11:24 Tim Rühlig joined France 24 to discuss President Xi's visit to Washington and what President Trump hailed as a "truly great friendship" between the two leaders. He also shared his assessment of the extension of the US-China trade truce, the Taiwan issue, and whether there is any room for cooperation between the two countries in the AI race.

Giuseppe Spatafora quoted in Euronews about Canada's 'associate membership' Giuseppe Spatafora quoted in Euronews about Canada's 'associate membership' marianna.liana… Wed, 10/07/2026 - 11:26 Discussing what Canada's 'associate membership' could entail, Giuseppe Spatafora told Euronews that "the most significant impact would be in the energy sector". Having Canada as a "safe supplier" could help EU companies reduce their dependence on countries such as China and the US. It is uncertain, however, whether this would translate into a revival of Europe's car industry, given Beijing's control over the entire supply chain. "But it can certainly help the EU's efforts to develop strategic industries such as defence and advanced manufacturing," he added.
north america

Giuseppe Spatafora quoted in Euronews about Canada's 'associate membership' Giuseppe Spatafora quoted in Euronews about Canada's 'associate membership' marianna.liana… Wed, 10/07/2026 - 11:26 Discussing what Canada's 'associate membership' could entail, Giuseppe Spatafora told Euronews that "the most significant impact would be in the energy sector". Having Canada as a "safe supplier" could help EU companies reduce their dependence on countries such as China and the US. It is uncertain, however, whether this would translate into a revival of Europe's car industry, given Beijing's control over the entire supply chain. "But it can certainly help the EU's efforts to develop strategic industries such as defence and advanced manufacturing," he added.

Joris Teer's interview with DW News on China's CRM dominance Joris Teer's interview with DW News on China's CRM dominance marianna.liana… Wed, 10/07/2026 - 11:30 Joris Teer joined Deutsche Welle News to discuss China's stranglehold on the critical raw materials supply chain and the immense influence this gives Beijing over the global economy. He shared his insights on how China's dominance in rare earths has altered US-China relations and shifted the Trump administration's narrative, why other countries are struggling to catch up with China's lead in rare earth mining and refining, and more.
china

Joris Teer's interview with DW News on China's CRM dominance Joris Teer's interview with DW News on China's CRM dominance marianna.liana… Wed, 10/07/2026 - 11:30 Joris Teer joined Deutsche Welle News to discuss China's stranglehold on the critical raw materials supply chain and the immense influence this gives Beijing over the global economy. He shared his insights on how China's dominance in rare earths has altered US-China relations and shifted the Trump administration's narrative, why other countries are struggling to catch up with China's lead in rare earth mining and refining, and more.

Tim Rühlig interviewed on the im Loop podcast Tim Rühlig interviewed on the im Loop podcast marianna.liana… Wed, 10/07/2026 - 11:15 As EU Member States consider a new trade instrument, Beijing is already threatening retaliatory measures. "It's an attempt to intimidate us and a tactic the Chinese have used for quite a while: before we take action, they engage in major sabre-rattling, hoping some Member States will fear the countermeasures and end up blocking EU action," said Tim Rühlig on the im Loop podcast, where he discussed the EU-China trade dispute. (in German)
european union

Tim Rühlig interviewed on the im Loop podcast Tim Rühlig interviewed on the im Loop podcast marianna.liana… Wed, 10/07/2026 - 11:15 As EU Member States consider a new trade instrument, Beijing is already threatening retaliatory measures. "It's an attempt to intimidate us and a tactic the Chinese have used for quite a while: before we take action, they engage in major sabre-rattling, hoping some Member States will fear the countermeasures and end up blocking EU action," said Tim Rühlig on the im Loop podcast, where he discussed the EU-China trade dispute. (in German)

Black Sea Security Seminar 26
world

Black Sea Security Seminar 26

Black Sea Security Seminar 26
world

Black Sea Security Seminar 26

Black Sea Security Seminar 26
world

Black Sea Security Seminar 26

Black Sea Security Seminar 26
world

Black Sea Security Seminar 26

Black Sea Security Seminar 26
world

Black Sea Security Seminar 26

Black Sea Security Seminar 26
world

Black Sea Security Seminar 26

Black Sea Security Seminar 26
world

Black Sea Security Seminar 26

Black Sea Security Seminar 26
world

Black Sea Security Seminar 26

Black Sea Security Seminar 26
world

Black Sea Security Seminar 26

Black Sea Security Seminar
world

Black Sea Security Seminar

Black Sea Security Seminar
world

Black Sea Security Seminar

Black Sea Security Seminar
world

Black Sea Security Seminar